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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ESSAYS ON TAX EVASION AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 
By 
 
ABEL BERHE EMBAYE 
 
May 2007 
 
 
Committee Chair:     Dr. James R. Alm 
 
Major Department:   Economics 
 
The dissertation aims at broadening our understanding of tax evasion and 
government spending in developing countries.  It comprises three essays. The first essay 
deals with estimation of tax evasion in a cross-section of developing countries by 
estimating their underground economies using the currency demand method.  By 
including enforcement parameters of the tax authorities as another factor of tax evasion in 
the currency demand equation, it presents theory-consistent tax evasion measurement.  
Our estimation strategy includes the use of the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data 
method that is suitable for correcting the endogeneity problem in the currency demand 
estimation.  The study finds substantial underground economy in developing countries, 
ranging from 2-67 percent of GDP. 
The second essay is concerned with time series measurement of the underground 
economy in South Africa using the currency demand method.  Unlike other similar 
studies on South Africa, it gives sufficient attention to the unit root problem that is 
common in time series analysis of the currency demand method.  Using the Error 
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Correction Method (ECM), it investigates the relationship between the tax rate and the 
currency demand, and presents yearly estimates of the underground economy for the 
period 1965-2002. 
The third essay deals with the behavior of government spending in South Africa 
for the period 1960-2002.  Since South Africa went through various political and 
macroeconomic shocks during this period, we augment measures of these shocks to the 
standard median voter model to assess the determinants of government spending in South 
Africa.  Using the Error Correction Method (ECM), we investigate the long-run and 
short-run behavior of government spending.  We find that, in addition to the tax share and 
the income of the median voter, macroeconomic and political shocks were also 
significant factors in determining government spending in South Africa.  This study 
broadens our understanding of the behavior of government spending in the presence of 
political and macroeconomic shocks that are common in small open developing 
economies.
  
 
1
ESSAY I:  INSTITUTIONS, TAX EVASION, AND CURRENCY DEMAND IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:  TOWARDS THEORY-CONSISTENT 
MEASUREMENT 
 
Introduction 
 There are many reasons for some economic activities to go unrecorded in the 
official statistics.  Of these, the most prevalent is the part associated with tax evasion.  
Tax evasion is considerable even in countries with efficient tax administration such as the 
U.S., for which recent estimates put the overall noncompliance rate for individual income 
tax at about 16 percent (IRS 2006).  The corresponding figure for developing countries is 
apparently higher due to the inefficiency in the tax system.  Alm, Bahl, and Murray 
(1991), for instance, estimate the rate of tax evasion for Jamaica at about 40 percent.  
Because of such considerable tax evasion, tax revenue mobilization is difficult in many of 
these countries.  As a result, these countries often resort to financial repression to meet 
their spending needs; however, this has led to various distortions, reduced investment, 
and economic growth (Alm and Buckley 1998; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1995). 
 Tax evasion causes various inefficiencies in the economy. One negative effect of 
tax evasion (underground economy) is that it distorts reported data, and this often causes 
inefficiency in the economy. For instance, the employment in the underground economy 
is often ignored when calculating the unemployment statistics in an economy; and this 
overstates the official unemployment statistics.  This might create undue pressure on 
policy makers to take measures aimed at increasing employment such as expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies.  Similarly, the inflation rate measured from the consumer 
price index using only the official economy’s basket of goods and services overstates the 
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inflation rate.1  This overcompensates people whose compensations are adjusted based on 
such inflation rate. 
 To avoid such misinformed decisions, policy makers need an estimate of the 
magnitude of tax evasion.  Having an estimate of tax evasion is also important for 
devising appropriate policies to combat tax evasion which in turn increases revenue for 
the government.  This is particularly important in developing countries, which are 
plagued by the problem of inadequate revenue in their endeavor to provide for efficient 
administration, public services, and economic growth. 
 There are different approaches of estimating tax evasion.2  The currency demand 
approach is by far the most widely used method.  This approach is due to Tanzi (1980),  
and is based on the premise that taxpayers who evade taxes use cash instead of demand 
deposits in transaction because cash is anonymous.  This implies that currency will be 
held in excess of that required for the “usual” motives of holding it.  By estimating the 
amount of currency holding that is due to these illegal transactions, one can come up with 
an estimate of tax evasion in an economy. 
There are many empirical studies on the estimation of the size of the underground 
economy for OECD countries using this method. Beginning with Tanzi (1980) study on 
the U.S. economy, these studies include, among other, Matthews (1982) for the U.K., 
Klovland (1984) for Norway and Sweden, Bajada (1999) for Australia, Giles (1999) for 
New Zealand, Schneider (2002) for 21 OECD countries, and Giles and Tedds (2002) for 
                                                 
1 This assumes that prices for goods and services produced in the underground economy are lower than that 
of the official economy.  This is likely to be the case because firms that evade taxes have a cost advantage 
compared to firms that do not. 
2 For a survey of the studies and descriptions of the methods of measuring the underground economy, see 
Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Schneider (2004) and Schneider and Enste (2000; 2002). 
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Canada.  These studies have broadened our understanding on the causes and extent of tax 
evasion in developed countries. 
However, the use of the currency approach to estimate the underground economy 
in developing countries has been ignored until recently.  To our knowledge, Bagachwa 
and Naho (1995) for Tanzania, Faal (2003) for Guyana, and Koyame (1996) for a panel 
of eight Sub-Saharan African countries are the only studies that apply the currency 
demand method to developing countries.  
These studies are also fraught with various weaknesses that make it necessary to 
investigate the issue further.  Since they include only the tax rate as a tax evasion factor, 
they omit the enforcement strength of the tax authorities. Thus, the estimated equations 
are misspecified, and the coefficient estimates from these equations are unreliable. Since 
this error is carried over in the calculation of the size of tax evasion, the underground 
economy estimates are also misleading. Thus, this essay addresses this omission by 
including various institutional quality indicators as a proxy for enforcement strength of 
tax authorities. 
The other limitation of existing studies on underground economy of developing 
countries is that they apply directly the Tanzi currency demand method without giving 
proper attention to the financial environment in which the economies of these countries 
operate.  The Tanzi model, as applied to the U.S. economy, assumes a stable monetary 
sector. The financial sector of developing countries is, however, unstable and prone to 
crisis.  The instability in the financial sector in turn results in loss of confidence in the 
financial system.  This reduces demand for domestic money including cash demand. We 
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extend the Tanzi model by adding the effects of financial instability or crisis on the 
currency demand. 
The other contributions of the study include the use of dynamic panel data 
estimation techniques to this literature.  The estimation method uses internal instruments 
to correct for the effects of endogeneity problem that is common in estimations of 
economic relationships.  The panel data approach is favored for at least two reasons.  
First, in the context of developing countries data for a long period of time that enables the 
application of time series methods are not available for a wide set of countries.  Thus, 
resorting to panel data estimation methods to overcome the data inadequacy is necessary.  
Second, even if some of the data were available for a long period of time, they may not 
show much variation over time in a given country so that their effect, though important in 
theory, may not be picked up adequately by time series estimation methods in a single 
country regression.  The effects of such variables can easily be dealt in panel data 
estimation by accounting for the cross-sectional variation of such variables.  This study is 
also more comprehensive in its coverage of the number of countries included in the 
sample compared to previous studies of the panel data approach.  This is important to 
prevent some biases that may arise in a small sample. 
The organization of the rest of the essay is as follows.  Section II reviews the 
literature of tax evasion and currency demand method.  Section III presents a model that 
will be a theoretical framework for tax evasion and currency holdings.  Section IV 
presents the estimation of the currency demand that is used to estimate the underground 
economy.  The same section also estimates the underground economy for a cross-section 
of developing countries.  The final section concludes. 
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Literature Review 
The objective of this section is first to review the relevant literature on tax evasion 
to summarize the current status of research on tax evasion. Then we show the effect of 
corruption and other institutional factors in tax administration of developing countries.  
Next we review the literature on currency demand method of estimating the size of tax 
evasion and indicate the major weaknesses of the current studies.  Finally, we discuss our 
contributions to the literature. 
 
Tax Evasion 
 The theoretical literature on tax evasion is based on seminal work of Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972) (hereafter, A-S), which in turn is based on Becker’s (1968) economic 
approach to crime.3  The A-S analyzes the evasion decision of an individual as a choice 
under uncertainty.  They are interested in studying the effect of the tax rate, taxpayer’s 
income, and enforcement parameters on the level of tax evasion. 
The model assumes a taxpayer with exogenous income of y subject to a tax rate 
of τ on this income.  The decision of the taxpayer is to report income of yx ≤ , or to hide 
and income of xye −= .  There is a probability of p  that the taxpayer will be audited.  
Upon audit the authority learns the true income of the taxpayer, and in that case the 
taxpayer pays a penalty at the rate of f  on the unreported income in addition to the tax 
                                                 
3 The purpose of this section is to review some of the relevant studies.  For a comprehensive survey of the 
literature on tax evasion, see Alm (1999), Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), and Slemrod and Yitzhaki 
(2002). 
  
 
6
due.  There are two states that the taxpayer faces: one if he is audited (caught) and 
another if not.  When he is not caught, his income is .)1( teyy N +−= τ   When he is 
caught, his income is .)()1( efyyC +−−= ττ   The taxpayer’s problem is given by: 
)()()1()( CN ypUyUpUE +−=  
where )(UE  denotes the expected utility of the taxpayer, and the utility function is 
assumed to be concave which implies that the taxpayer is risk averse. 
Using these assumptions the authors show that the amount of income unreported 
is negatively related both to the probability of audit and to the penalty rate.4 
The relationship between the amount of unreported income and the true income of 
the taxpayer is ambiguous.  However, A-S showed that the effect of the taxpayer’s before 
tax income on the proportion of income unreported depends only on the relative risk 
aversion of the taxpayer’s utility function. Thus, when actual income varies, the fraction 
of income not declared decreases (increases) if the relative risk aversion is an increasing 
(decreasing) function of income.  
Regarding the relationship between the tax rate and the amount of income 
unreported, a notable feature of the A-S model is that it lends an ambiguous result. Under 
the plausible assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, A-S show that the 
                                                 
4  The first order condition for optimality is given by 0))((')(')1( =−+− fypUyUp CN ττ .  The second 
order condition is 0))((')(')1( 22 <−+−= fypUyUpD CN ττ .  Using the first order condition we have: 
{ })()()1()(')1(1* NACAN yRyRfyUpDye −−−−=∂∂ τ ;  where AR  is Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion 
measure.  For 1>f  and a decreasing absolute risk aversion utility function, 0* >∂∂ ye .  
)](')(')1[(1)]()([)1(1* CNCA
N
A ypUyUpD
yRyRep
D
e −−−−−−=∂∂ ττ , which has ambiguous sign. 
{ } 0))((')('1* <−+−=∂∂ ττ fypUyU
D
pe CN . Finally, { } 0))((')('1* <−+=∂∂ ττ fyUyUp
D
fe CN . 
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substitution and income effects of the change in the tax rate conflict each other resulting 
in an ambiguous overall effect.  Yitzhaki (1974) resolves this ambiguity.  By assuming 
that the penalty rate is imposed on the evaded tax rather than on the unreported income, 
he shows that there is no substitution effect of the change in tax rate and the remaining 
income effect implies that, as the tax rate increases, the amount of income unreported 
decreases.  Although the Yitzhaki model resolves the ambiguity of the A-S model 
regarding the effects of the tax rate on the extent of tax evasion, its conclusion is against 
the commonly held view that a higher tax rate increases tax evasion. 
A number of later studies have extended and generalized the A-S model of tax 
evasion in different ways.  One of these is by including the labor supply decision with the 
tax evasion decision so as to make income endogenous. This extension has been 
investigated, among others, by Pencavel (1979), Cowell (1981), and Sandmo (1981).  
The salient feature of these models is that the unambiguous results regarding the effect of 
enforcement on tax evasion that the A-S study shows are no longer valid unless further 
restrictive assumptions are invoked.  Sandmo (1981), however, develops a model in 
which an increase in the penalty rate causes a decrease in the supply of hours worked in 
the underground market, implying that the portion of income not reported will decrease; 
however, the model does not generate a clear-cut comparative statics result regarding the 
relationship between tax evasion and the tax rate or the probability of being caught. 
Another extension is to consider the interaction of the taxpayers and the tax 
authority by making the probability of audit endogenous.  The models in this strand of the 
literature can be classified into two groups (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998;  Alm 
1999).  The first is one in which the government can pre-commit to the level of audit it 
  
 
8
makes.  Such issues are studied by employing the tools used in the standard Principal-
Agent problem.  In the second group of models, commitment by the tax authority is not 
possible, and strategic interactions between the taxpayer and the tax authority arise.  Such 
models are analyzed using game theory tools.  The pioneering works are by Graetz, 
Reinganum, and Wilde (1986), and Reinganum and Wilde (1985).  The former develop 
an interactive game theoretic approach to tax evasion, while the latter develop a 
principal-agent framework. 
A notable feature of the typical A-S type models is that they derive their results 
under the restrictive assumption that taxpayers report only a single piece of information 
to the tax authorities.  Current research, however, recognizes that taxpayers report more 
than single piece of information.  Recently, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) study the 
tax evasion decision of taxpayers under multiple line-items reporting such as 
underreporting of income and over-reporting of deductions .  The authors are interested in 
the effect of enforcement effort on a given mode of tax evasion and on the overall tax 
evasion.  Their model shows that income and enforcement parameters have an ambiguous 
effect on compliance in both modes. 
There are few theoretical models that relate tax evasion to macroeconomic 
factors.  Fishburn (1981) analyzes the effect of inflation on the level of tax evasion. One 
way inflation can affect the decision to evade taxes is by eroding the real value of a given 
level of nominal disposable income.  This provides an incentive for the taxpayer to 
restore his purchasing power through evasion. Fishburn’s results show that a risk-neutral 
individual’s evasion decision is independent of the price level, while that of a risk-averse 
individual depends on the properties of the relative risk-aversion function.  In particular, 
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the observed proportion of true income unreported by a risk-averse individual is a 
nondecreasing (nonincreasing) function of the price level if relative risk aversion is an 
increasing (decreasing) function of income.  Another way inflation can affect tax evasion 
is through tax bracket creep.  Since most tax systems are not indexed, higher inflation 
pushes taxpayers into higher tax brackets even though their income is adjusted with cost 
of living index changes. 
Turning to the empirical literature review of tax evasion, Clotfelter (1983) is the 
first to test empirically the A-S model.  Using data from the 1969 Tax Compliance 
Measurement Program (TCMP), he tests the effect of taxpayers’ after-tax income, the tax 
rate, and other socio-economic and demographic characteristic on the level of tax evasion 
by estimating a standard tobit model.  He finds that the coefficient estimates for both 
after-tax income and tax rates are positive and significant.  In particular, he finds that the 
estimated point elasticity of underreported income with respect to the marginal tax rate in 
the range of .5 to 3. 
Alm, Bahl, and Murray have extensively investigated the relationship between 
government policy parameters and tax evasion and avoidance in the developing 
countries’ context in several papers.  Alm, Bahl, and Murray (1990) develop and test a 
model to examine the effect of government policy on tax evasion and avoidance 
decisions of taxpayers.  The study includes such factors as the tax rate, the payroll tax 
contributions and benefits, the probability of audit, and the penalty rates.  Using 1983 
Jamaican individual level data, they estimate share equations for three dependent 
variables: avoidance, evasion, and reported income.  The results show that the tax base 
rises with higher benefits for payroll tax contributions and falls with higher marginal tax 
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rates, more severe penalties, and a higher probability of detection, as individuals 
substitute towards avoidance income. 
Alm, Bahl, and Murray (1991) examine the tax evasion behavior of the self-
employed.  Using 1983 data, they estimate two equations: one for underreported income 
and another for underreported tax. Their findings indicate that in both equations the 
marginal tax rate is positive and highly significant.  This implies that higher tax rate 
encourages tax evasion for this group of taxpayers.  Their finding also shows that the 
coefficient estimate on income is positive and highly significant. 
Alm, Bahl, and Murray (1993) contradict the positive relationship between tax 
rate and evasion.  This study estimates three-equation models in which the dependent 
variables are evasion, reported income, and “allowance income.” 
Feinstein (1991) uses pooled 1982 and 1985 TCMP data in order to decipher the 
independent effect of the tax rate and income on tax evasion in light of the usual strong 
positive relationship between tax rates and income.  Because marginal tax rates changed 
over this period for a given level of income, it is easier to identify the separate effects of 
the two variables.  The results from the pooled data show that the coefficient on income 
in the evasion equation is insignificant; contrary to Clotfelter’s finding, the results show a 
negative relationship between marginal tax rates and tax evasion. 
Joulfaian and Rider (1996) examine the impact of marginal tax rates on tax 
evasion for lower-income taxpayers in the presence of negative income tax.  Their notion 
of misreporting includes the possibility that taxpayers may over-report their income it is 
to their advantage to do so. Using 1988 TCMP data, they find that misreported income is 
not affected by tax rates except for the modest positive relationship between tax evasion 
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and the marginal tax rate in the case of proprietor’s income.  However, their result is 
restricted to low income taxpayers, and hence may not apply to higher income groups 
who usually have higher audit rates. 
Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) test the effect of enforcement effort on tax 
evasion under multiple modes of tax evasion using the 1985 TCMP data. Their estimation 
results shows that increased enforcement effort has a positive effect on compliance in the 
targeted mode, a negative effect in the untargeted mode, and a positive overall effect on 
tax compliance. 
Among those studies that test for the effect of macroeconomic factors on tax 
evasion, we mention Crane and Nourzad (1986).  They test the effect of inflation on 
aggregate tax evasion in the U.S. over the period 1947-81, and find that tax evasion is 
positively related to the inflation rate. 
 
Corruption in Tax Administration 
One of the notable features of the literature on tax evasion is that it often assumes 
a corruption-free tax administration.  The reason for this is partly because tax evasion 
research has assumed the institutional environment of the developed countries.  In these 
economies corruption is not a serious problem, particularly in tax administration. 
In developing countries, however, corruption poses serious concerns by affecting 
a wide chunk of the economy.  The importance of corruption at large has been noted by 
many economists (Rose-Ackerman 1978; Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Mauro 1995; 
Bardhan 1997).  It is widely believed that corruption of public officials is prevalent 
phenomena that can seriously hamper investment, economic growth, and the stability of 
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socio-economic institutions in these countries.  More particularly, corruption in tax 
administration affects the level of tax revenue that can be collected in developing 
countries.  Some economists argue that it is more important than the tax rate policy.  For 
instance, Casanegra de Jantscher (1990) argues that in developing countries “tax 
administration is tax policy.” 
Although a relatively extensive literature has investigated the causes and effect of 
corruption, relatively few studies have attempted to address the interaction between tax 
evasion and corruption.  In general, the level of tax evasion in the economy depends on 
several structural and institutional factors such as the degree of risk aversion, the wealth 
of taxpayers, the overall tax burden of the economy, and the efficiency of the tax 
enforcing authority.  The enforcement strength in turn depends on the extent of 
corruption entrenched in the tax administration, which in turn depends on the wages of 
public officials or the degree of monitoring or both. 
Martinez-Vasquez, Arze, and Boex (2004) explain why there could be an inverse 
relationship between corruption and the tax revenue per GDP collected by authorities as 
follows:“if tax collectors or tax administration officials engage in corrupt practices 
(either directly stealing from the treasury, or by allowing taxpayers to evade taxes in 
return for a bribe), then corruption on the revenue side will result in direct decreases in 
overall revenue collections.” 
Chander and Wilde (1992) develop a model of the effect of corruption on tax 
evasion.  The study investigates the effect of the presence of corruption on tax evasion in 
a game theoretic framework.  The study assumes risk neutral taxpayers, lump-sum 
bribery penalty costs, independence between the size of the bribe and the likelihood of 
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bribery detection, and a constant likelihood of bribery detection.  The general conclusion 
is that corruption defeats the effectiveness of government’s deterrence policy and that 
there is a possibility that an increase in the tax rate or the fine rate could actually decrease 
government revenue.  The model also clearly shows that the response of government 
revenue to an increase in either tax rate or the fine rate is less in the presence of 
corruption than otherwise. 
The problem of the relationship between enforcement, corruption, and deterrence 
and its normative ramifications have been recently analyzed by Polinsky and Shavell 
(2001).  These authors examine both the optimal amount of resources to be allocated to 
law enforcement, the detection of bribery, and the optimal fines structure.  Since bribery 
agreements dilute deterrence of the underlying violation, it is desirable for society to 
attempt to detect and penalize corruption in order to preserve a given degree of 
deterrence.  An application of this finding to the context of tax evasion would imply that 
taxpayers have to be audited and auditors have to be monitored since fighting corruption 
may be worthwhile in order to boost tax compliance.  Similar to Becker (1968) 
conclusions, these authors find that that both the optimal fine for tax evasion and the 
optimal fine for bribery should be maximal (usually equal to taxpayer’s wealth or 
income) since detecting any violation involves cost. 
Besley and McLaren (1993) examine the effect of different wage schemes for tax 
collectors on tax evasion in the presence of corruption.  These schemes are the ones that 
pay the reservation wage, below the reservation wage, and the efficiency wage.  The 
study demonstrates that the efficiency wage strategy may not be a good idea much of the 
time for maximization government revenue.  In fact, under some conditions the 
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government may be better off paying a rate below the efficiency wage.  In such cases the 
government should depend on monitoring tax inspectors as a means of raising revenue. 
Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo (1999) study the equity and efficiency implications 
of tax evasion in the presence of corruption.  They include extortion (demanding money 
from non-violators) as well as bribery (demanding money from violators) in their notion 
of corruption. The model shows that the distributional effects of evasion and corruption 
are unambiguously regressive under the usually practiced tax collection schemes.  The 
other result is that collecting progressive taxes without inducing evasion or corruption 
may require that inspectors be paid commission on high income reports only. 
Alm and Martinez-Vazquez (2003) provide another way in which institutions 
affect the level of tax evasion in developing and transition countries.  They argue that the 
existence of a “social norm” of compliance and the presence of an effective service-
oriented tax administration are crucial in determining tax evasion.  Taxpayers expect a 
fair service from their government for the taxes they pay.  The higher the service 
taxpayers receive the higher the tax compliance. Conversely, in a country where the 
government wastes taxpayers’ money because of corruption and other inefficiencies, tax 
evasion will be widespread. 
There are some empirical studies relating indirectly corruption and inefficiency in 
the tax system.  In analyzing the impact of political instability on seigniorage and 
conventional taxes, Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992) argue that countries with 
more corruption have inefficient tax systems, forcing governments to resort to printing 
more money.  Therefore, they conclude that countries with more corruption are subject to 
higher inflation rates.  Al-Marhubi (2000) provides empirical evidence that supports this 
  
 
15
claim.  Using cross-section data for 41 countries, he finds a significantly positive 
relationship between corruption and inflation.  Ghura (1998) is another cross-section 
study that attempts to address the effect of corruption on government finance.  The study 
investigates the effect of corruption and macroeconomic factors on the level of tax 
revenues in a panel of Sub-Saharan African countries.  The study finds that corruption 
negatively affects the level of tax revenue, other things being equal. 
In summary, tax administration is an important aspect of tax revenue collection 
and tax evasion policies in developing countries.  The efficiency of tax administration is 
influenced by the existence of corruption in these countries.  Thus, the extent of 
corruption should be included as one of the determinant of tax evasion in developing 
countries. 
 
The Currency Demand Approach 
In the previous sections, we discussed some of the theoretical and empirical 
studies on tax evasion.  One of the ways in which these tax evasion studies have been 
useful is in furnishing the theoretical basis for the analysis of unreported economic 
activities at the aggregate level.  One of the shortcomings of investigating tax evasion 
using data from audits and amnesty is that the data are from small a sample of the 
population, and also there is a sample selection problem in that the sample is typically 
taken only from those who report their income.  Another approach that economists have 
sought to remedy this problem is to employ aggregate indicators of tax evasion activities.  
One of these approaches is the currency demand method pioneered by Tanzi (1980).  
This method begins with the premise that tax evaders, in order to leave no trace of their 
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illegal activities, undertake their transactions using currency rather than demand deposits; 
thus, part of currency demand can be used as a reasonable indicator of the level of tax 
evasion. 
The method of currency demand to measure tax evasion is grounded in Cagan’s 
(1958) study that investigates the determinants of Currency to M2 ratio; however, he does 
not use the relationship to estimate the size of tax evasion.  Cagan included tax variables 
as one of these determinants.  His argument was that since currency gives anonymity to 
tax evasion activities, taxpayers use currency rather than other methods of payment such 
as checks.  Thus, as the tax burden increases, tax evasion increases and hence the demand 
for currency relative to broader money increases.  To test his hypothesis, Cagan regresses 
the currency to M2 ratio on the tax rate, interest rate, and income. 
Tanzi uses a variant of this econometric estimation to measure the underground 
economy (or tax evasion) in the United States for the period 1929-76.  Tanzi first 
establishes that the tax rate as measure of tax burden in the economy is associated with 
the currency ratio, ceteris paribus.  The measure of tax burden used is the statutory tax 
rate, or the ratio of personal income taxes to personal income net of transfers.  The 
control variables are the interest rate, per capita income, and the share of wages and 
salaries in personal income.  He finds a positive relationship between tax rates and the 
currency ratio, which supports the commonly held view that an increased tax burden is 
associated with increased tax evasion.  With the estimated coefficients of this regression, 
he then calculates the difference between the actual currency holding for the year 1976 
and currency held if there was no tax evasion.  The no tax evasion situation is assumed to 
be when the tax rate is zero (or at its lowest level for the period).  This difference is the 
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illegal stock of money.  Then, he multiplies the illegal currency stock by the velocity of 
money to get the value of illegal transactions that this stock of illegal currency supports.  
This amount, which is the underground economy’s income, is then multiplied by the tax 
rate to arrive at the tax revenue lost to the government.  Tanzi finds that for 1976 the 
underground economy of the U.S. is between 10 to 31 percent, depending on the tax rate 
definition used. 
A number of studies have replicated Tanzi’s study on OECD countries.  Matthews 
(1982) studies the effect of the income tax rate and the VAT rate on the ratio of cash to 
demand deposits in the United Kingdom, and using this relationship he calculates the 
underground economy for the U.K. at about 7.5 percent of GNP. 
Klovland (1984) also tests the effect of marginal tax rates on the currency demand 
for Norway and Sweden.  While the estimations for Sweden corroborate the positive 
effect of marginal tax rate on currency holdings, he does not find such effects for 
Norway.  For Sweden he calculates the hidden economy to be 3-20 percent of GDP, 
depending on the different specification estimated and the tax rate definition used.  Not 
finding a robust positive relationship between the tax rate and the currency holdings in 
Norway’s case, Klovland does not calculate the hidden economy of Norway.  Other 
recent studies that employ the currency approach for OECD countries, include Bajada 
(1999) for Australia, Giles (1999) for New Zealand, Schneider (2002) for 21 OECD 
countries, and Giles and Tedds (2002) for Canada. 
The use of the currency demand approach in studying the underground economy 
of developing countries has been neglected until recently.   To our knowledge Bagachwa 
and Naho (1995) for Tanzania, Saunders and Loots (2005) for South Africa, Koyame 
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(1996) for eight Sub-Saharan African countries, and Faal (2003) for Guyana are the only 
studies that use the currency demand approach for the economies of developing 
countries.  Except for Koyame, all these studies are time series applications of the 
currency equation.  Koyame employs a panel data estimation approach to estimate the 
relationship between currency ratio and the tax rate and other control variables, and she 
reports estimates of the underground economy ranging from 1.5 to 17 percent of GDP. 
These recent applications of the currency method for developing countries are 
important in lending new insights into the size and causes of tax evasion in these groups 
of countries.  Unfortunately, these studies are infested with various weaknesses that make 
it necessary to investigate the issue further. First, they include only the tax rate as the 
cause of tax evasion, ignoring the enforcement strength of the tax authorities. Second, a 
direct application of the Tanzi (1980) method to the context of developing countries is 
not appropriate, as discussed below. 
The main limitation of previous studies of the currency demand method is their 
omission of the enforcement strength of the authorities in the estimation of the currency 
equation (and in the calculation of the underground economy).  The seriousness of 
omitting the enforcement strength in the estimation can be made more clear by taking two 
countries, say A and B, in which A imposes a higher marginal tax rate on income but at 
the same time keeps its institutions efficient to enforce the tax laws, while country B 
imposes a lower marginal tax rate but has institutions that are inefficient in catching and 
apprehending tax evaders.  Therefore, empirical models that do not control for the 
enforcement strength will conclude that evasion will be higher in country A than B, when 
in fact the opposite is the case. The econometric implication of the omission is clear.  The 
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exclusion of the enforcement variable creates not only the problem associated with 
omitted variables but also results in faulty conclusions in applying the estimated equation 
in sizing the underground economy across countries.  The error is that a country with 
higher tax burden will have typically higher tax evasion.  This is particularly important in 
studies that focus on developing countries, which have varying degrees of institutional 
development.  The appropriate approach is, then, to take into account both the tax rate 
and the enforcement variables.  Therefore, in this essay we contribute to the literature by 
considering the effects of both. 
The other limitation of existing studies of the currency equation in developing 
countries is that they inappropriately apply the Tanzi method in the context of these 
countries.  The Tanzi study as applied to the U.S. economy assumes a stable monetary 
sector, which is not the case for most of these countries.  In some developing and 
transition countries there is a large chunk of unrecorded foreign currency held by 
residents either for tax evasion purposes or just because of lack of confidence in the 
financial system.  In this case, the use of domestic money (both currency and M2) 
declines.  The effect of financial instability on the demand of currency relative to M2 is 
ambiguous. If the dependent variable is modified to include the demand for foreign 
currency, the effect of financial instability can be more precisely addressed.  See, for 
example, Feige (2003).  Since data on foreign currency outside banks are not available, 
we do not tackle this issue in this study.  However, we control for the financial instability 
with currency to M2 ratio as the regressand, and leave the sign of the coefficient to be an 
empirical issue. 
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Moreover, our study is the first to introduce dynamic panel data estimation 
techniques to the empirical literature.  This technique uses internal instruments to correct 
for the endogeneity problem that is common in estimations of economic relationships.  A 
panel data approach is favored for at least two reasons.  First, data for a long period of 
time that enables the application of time series methods are often not available.  Panel 
data estimation overcomes the data inadequacy.  Second, even if some of the data are 
available for a long period of time, they might not show much variation over time in a 
given country, so that their effect might not be picked up adequately by time series 
estimation methods in a single country regression.  Here again, panel data estimation is 
necessary to capture the effect of such variables.  This study is also more comprehensive 
in its coverage of the number of countries included.  This is important to prevent some 
biases that might be created by small samples. 
 
  
 
21
Theoretical Framework 
 In this section we present a theoretical model that will be the basis for the 
estimation part of the essay. This model relates the microeconomic theory of tax evasion 
and the macro model of currency demand method of estimating the size of tax evasion. 
While the microeconomic model is based on the model of income tax evasion of A-S, the 
currency demand method is based on Tanzi (1983) approach. 
 
The Model 
The model presented here is an extension of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
model as applied by Chen (2003) in a dynamic setting.  Chen does not model the 
financial asset demand behavior of taxpayers. We build on this study to relate tax evasion 
and currency demand behavior of taxpayers.  The model set up is as follows.  Assume 
utility maximizing individuals whose taxable income is derived from labor income and 
interest payments on capital holdings.  Assuming, a unit of labor is exogenously supplied 
by the taxpayer, 
kiwy k+= ,                                                                              (1.1) 
where y  is taxpayer’s true income, w  is the wage earnings, ki  return to capital, and k  is 
the amount of physical capital hold by the taxpayer. The taxpayer correctly knows his 
income y.  However, the tax authorities do not know the true income of the taxpayer and 
hence depend on the taxpayer’s self reporting unless they decide to audit the taxpayer. 
The probability of being audited p depends on the efficiency of the tax administration 
(corruptibility of tax officials). Upon audit the taxpayer pays a penalty at a rate of f on 
the unreported taxes. 
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 The taxpayer is required to pay tax on this income at a rate ofτ .  Suppose we 
denote the fraction of income y  reported to the authorities byβ .  The amount that the 
taxpayer pays in taxes is yτβ . We assume that cheating involves transaction costs.  These 
costs include, among others, bribes paid to tax officials.  To avoid corner solutions, these 
costs are assumed to be concave with respect to the amount of tax evasion, specifically 
given by 20 )1( β−h  with the cost parameter .00 >h   0h  is a measure of the prevalence of 
corruption in the tax administration with a smaller 0h  implying a more corrupt tax 
administration (hence it is easier to dodge taxes).  This notion can easily be captured by 
assuming that )( 0hpp =  with .0)(' 0 >hp  
The taxpayer must decide how much of his income to report.  Since there are two 
states of nature, the taxpayer’s disposable income is a stochastic variable given by the 
following: 
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where 20 )1()]1)(1(1[ ββττ −−−−−= hpfE , dy  is the disposable income to be spent or 
used up in paying other compliance costs, and Eτ  can be thought of the effective tax rate. 
This disposable income is then used for consumption x and for acquiring assets. 
We have three assets: physical capital and two financial assets.  The financial assets are 
currency c and demand deposits d.  Demand deposits can be broadly defined to include 
time deposits.  There are costs and benefits of holding financial assets.  Holding currency 
has the benefit of reducing the cost of evasion in that it makes transactions (involving tax 
evasion) anonymous. More specifically assume that  
0)('),( >= uuc ygygr  ,                                                                 (1.3) 
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where yyu )1( β−= is the unreported income and cr  is the return to holding currency. 
The cost of holding currency is the erosion of purchasing power due to inflation .π   
Demand deposit has the benefit of earning interest.  We capture these asset benefits and 
costs in the budget constraint of the taxpayer.  The budget constraint of the taxpayer is 
given as follows: 
0)()1( =−−−+−+−+− cdkdicrxTy dcE &&&πτ ,                  (1.4) 
where the first term is the disposable income from (1.2) above; tT  is a lump-sum transfer 
from the government; cr  is the return to holding cash; π  is the inflation rate;  dr  is the 
interest rate on demand and time deposits; and cdk &&& ,,  are, respectively, the change in 
physical capital, demand deposits, and currency holdings.  As equation (1.4) shows, the 
receipt side of the budget includes the after tax earned income, government transfers, and 
the gross earnings from holding the assets, and the expenditure side of budget constraint 
includes the currency erosion due to inflation and the expenses made to acquire new asset 
holdings.  
Finally, we have a cash (liquidity) in advance constraint that constrains the 
individual in his consumption and physical capital investment.  Unlike the usual cash in 
advance constraint in which currency and demand deposits are perfect substitutes, we 
allow for imperfect substitutability of the two assets, as in Walsh (1984).  This 
assumption is necessary to get well behaved asset demand functions. 
 dckx +≤+ & ,                                                                             (1.5) 
The liquidity constraint shows that the magnitude of consumption and physical capital 
investment cannot exceed the sum of the square root of the amount of the financial assets 
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held by the taxpayer.  The consumer maximizes the following utility function 
dtexu tt∫∞ −
0
)( ρ  subject to (1.1)-(1.5).  The current value Hamiltonian of the taxpayer is as 
follows: 
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The taxpayer chooses β,,, ttt dcx , and the first order conditions for his optimal choices 
are given, respectively, by: 
μλ +=)(' xu                                                                                         (1.6) 
[ ] 0)1(2)1( 0 =−+−− yhpft βτλ                                                           (1.7) 
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We concentrate on the steady state behavior of our variables of interest.  In the 
steady state, tλ& =0.  Equation (1.7) gives the optimal tax evasion decision of the 
individual; and Equations (1.8) and (1.9) give the asset demand of the taxpayer.  Using 
equation (1.7), the percentage of income unreported is give by:  
02/)1()1( hpf−=− τβ                                                                        (1.10) 
Multiply both sides of (1.9) by y  to get the absolute per capita unreported income as 
y
h
pfyu
02
)1( −= τ ,                                                                           (1.11) 
where yyu )1( β−≡  is the unreported income.  As can be seen from this optimal choice 
at the steady state, the amount of evaded income is directly related to the tax rate and 
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inversely related to the enforcement parameters.  Unreported income is also directly 
related to the true income of the taxpayer.  Mathematically, we have 0
*
>∂
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p
yu .  Since )(' 0hpp = , we can easily show that the unreported 
income is inversely related to the efficiency in the tax administration, as is the probability 
of audit. 
Using equations (1.8) and (1.9) we get the relationship: 
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This relationship shows that the currency ratio is directly related to the return on 
currency, cr , and inversely related to the return on demand deposits, and the inflation 
rate.  As defined broadly, the return to currency is the provision of anonymity for 
transactions involving tax evasion.  The expression for the currency ratio can be easily 
related to the partial reporting of income using equation (1.3) and (1.11) above as 
follows: 
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Since 0'>g , it can easily be shown that: 
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The comparative statics shows that the currency ratio is higher the higher the tax 
evasion, which is explained by the tax rate, the true income of the taxpayer, and the 
enforcement parameters represented by the probability of audit and the penalty rate. 
 Equation (1.13) also yields the following two comparative statics: 0)/( <∂
∂
dr
dc , 
and 0)/( <∂
∂
π
dc .  The latter relationship, however, does not take into account the “tax 
bracket creep” effect of inflation that relates inflation and currency ratio positively.  
Thus, the sign of π∂
∂ )/( dc  is ambiguous when the two effects of inflation are taken into 
account. 
 
Other Determinants of the Currency Ratio 
 In the preceding section, we developed a model that relates tax evasion to the 
demand for currency relative to demand deposits.  However, there are some other factors 
that our model does not capture.  These other factors, which have been included in 
previous studies that use the Tanzi method, are discussed below.5 
Individuals hold currency not only to hide their transaction of illegal activities but 
also to undertake legitimate transactions.  Cash in hand is the most liquid asset there is.  
Such transactions depend on the income or spending habits of individuals.  Thus, income 
                                                 
5 Since M2 is currency plus demand deposits, the behavior of currency to demand ratio is similar to 
currency to M2 ratio, hence we use the latter to be in line with the Tanzi’s. 
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as a proxy for the level of transactions is a determinant of currency demand, and should 
enter the relationship regardless of tax evasion effects.  The higher income people have 
the more spending they make implying a positive relationship between currency demand 
and the level of income.  This is also true for other components of M2.  From a different 
angle, a country’s income is a measure of the level of development, and, as a country 
grows, it uses less currency and more of demand deposits as a sign of “sophistication.”  
Recall also that from the behavioral model of the tax evasion above, the relative currency 
demand and income are positively related. Thus, the overall effect of income on currency 
to M2 ratio is ambiguous. 
Cagan (1958) discusses the degree of urbanization as a potential factor affecting 
the currency ratio.  He argues that the effect of this factor is ambiguous because there are 
two conflicting effects.  On the one hand, urbanization causes people to trade where they 
are not known, which reduces the use of checks.  On the other hand, the use of checks is 
lower in rural areas than in cities where the populace is more sophisticated.  However, the 
argument that parties must know each other to use checks is not convincing, and this 
study takes the later effect of urbanization to be more in operation; hence urbanization is 
expected to be negatively related to currency ratio. 
Koyame (1996) includes the level of education as additional factor in the currency 
equation.  The use of checks and other saving accounts is more prevalent when the 
populace is educated.  Thus we also include education as a factor determining the 
currency ratio.  We expect the sign on this coefficient to be negative. 
To these factors we add the effect of financial uncertainties on the currency ratio 
to account for the instability or uncertainty of the financial sector of developing countries.  
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We attempt to capture these uncertainties by the rate of inflation and exchange rate 
depreciation.  
Summarizing, we have the basic currency to M2 relation of: 
 ),,,,,,,,(2/ ErEdUbrfpyfMC d πτ= , 
where dr  is the rate of interest on components of M2 that pay interest, Ub  is 
urbanization, Ed  is a measure of the level of education, and Er is the rate of exchange 
rate depreciation.  The other symbols are as previously defined.  The expect sign on the 
coefficient of tax rate is positive, consistent with the notion that the general tax burden 
increases tax evasion.  The sign on income is ambiguous.  The signs of the coefficients of 
the two enforcement parameters ( p and f ) are negative, implying that the higher the 
probability of detection or the severe the penalty for violations the lower the currency 
ratio (tax evasion).  The coefficient on the interest rate is expected to be negative showing 
that as the cost of holding currency increases the currency ratio declines.  The expected 
signs of the coefficients of urbanization and education level are negative. 
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Data, Estimation Methodology and Results 
 In this section, we present the results of the estimation of the currency equation 
and estimates of the size of tax evasion for cross-section of countries.  First, we briefly 
discuss the data for the variables and their sources.  Next, we discuss the estimation 
methodologies we adopt.  Then, we estimate the currency equation, and, using this 
estimated relationship, we estimate the underground economies of the countries. 
 
Data 
Our model of tax evasion and currency demand explains the currency to M2 ratio 
as a function of the tax rate, the income of the representative taxpayer, the probability of 
audit, the penalty rate, the interest rate, the inflation rate, urbanization, the education 
level, and the exchange rate depreciation.  The probability of audit and the penalty rates 
are the two variables measuring the enforcement strength of the tax authorities.  These 
two variables along with the tax rate are the main variables accounting for tax evasion in 
the currency equation. 
The countries in our sample are non-OECD developing countries, namely 
Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria,  Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippine, 
Poland, Russia, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, 
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Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe.  The sources and the definitions of the data used are explained below. 
 
Description of the Data for Enforcement Parameters 
In the theoretical model of tax evasion the parameters that measure enforcement 
strength are the probability of detection and the penalty rate.  The first measures the 
likelihood (certainty) that tax evaders will be caught.  The second measures the severity 
of punishment.  Ideally, the probability of audit would be measured by the number of 
people audited (or the number of violations detected) per total number of taxpayers; and 
the penalty rate would be measured by the statutory rate at which the government 
penalized the violators.  This rate is often set proportional to unreported income or 
unreported tax liabilities.  Such data are not available.  Even if they were, they are 
unlikely to be of much use in countries where the tax administration is corrupt.  This is 
because when one thinks about tax law enforcement, the letter of the laws is one thing 
and the zeal (efficiency) with which these “good” laws are implemented is another. 
Therefore, in this study we concentrate on a general measure of the efficiency of 
the tax system as proxy for enforcement strength.  We use the average of measures of the 
degree of corruption, the quality of bureaucracy, and the rule of law as proxy for the 
efficiency of the tax system.6  When a taxpayers contemplate underreporting income, 
they take into account how efficient or strong is the bureaucracy in fighting tax evasion.  
In a corrupt tax administration, it would be easy to get away with tax evasion (if caught) 
by bribing the tax collector. 
                                                 
6 We have also used these three indices separately as measures of enforcement strength of the tax 
authorities, and the results are similar with the one when the average of the indices is used.  These results 
are not reported here. 
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However, the corruption data available do not measure corruption in tax 
administration per se. The same holds for the other institutional quality indicators 
mentioned above.  For example, the corruption index in a given year is the average of the 
degree of corruption in a wide range of activities, among which tax administration is only 
one.  But if we think of corruption as a reflection of the government’s inefficiency, then 
corruption in one function of the government will likely be reflected in other functions.  
Likewise, an improvement of efficiency in one of the functions of government generally 
spills over to the other functions, balancing the efficiency of the bureaucracy in all other 
functions of the government on average.  Thus, our use of these institutional indicators at 
large as a measure of enforcement strength in tax administration does not bias our results.  
It is because of this implicit assumption that Ghura (1998) uses the available corruption 
data in the analysis of the effect of corruption on tax revenue for a sample of Sub-Saharan 
African countries.  Loayza (1996) likewise makes use of the quality of bureaucracy index 
as a proxy for enforcement strength in the estimation of underground economy in Latin 
American countries using the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) method.7  
The discussion of data sources for these variables is in order. 
The Corruption, Quality of Bureaucracy and Rule of Law indices are drawn from 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which is a publication of Political Risk 
Services (PRS).  PRS is a commercial service that provides financial, economic, and 
political risk assessment for international investors for a wide set of countries.  ICRG’s 
                                                 
7 The MIMIC model is another method of estimating the underground economy. Its procedure entails 
identifying multiple indicators of underground economy (such as currency demand or official labor force) 
and multiple causes of underground economy (such as the tax rate or government regulation). Then an 
index of the underground economy is computed using the estimated coefficients of the cause variables. 
Finally, the index is converted to an absolute value of the underground economy using some extraneous 
information.  This method has been severely criticized by Breusch (2005). 
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data are based on polls and ratings of experts who have working knowledge in the 
countries. 
These data for the corruption variable available in ICRG are probably the most 
widely used corruption measure.  The data have a wide coverage in terms of the number 
of countries and the series span.  Annual data are available starting from 1982, and the 
latest data cover over 100 countries.  This makes the data suitable for conducting panel 
data estimation.8 
The data used here are the academic version of the ICRG data set for the period 
spanning 1982-2003.  The original data range from 0 (high corruption) to 6 (low 
corruption).  To facilitate discussion, the original data are modified in such a way that a 
higher index indicates higher corruption.  As per the ICRG definition, higher corruption 
means that government officials are likely to demand special payments and that illegal 
payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government in the form of 
“bribes connected with imports and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment 
(emphasis added), police protection or loans.”9 
The other two institutional efficiency indicators are also measured on a 0-6 
scale.10 The bureaucratic quality index measures the strength and expertise of government 
bureaucracy to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruption in government 
services.  It also signifies an established mechanism for recruitment and training.  
                                                 
8 The other most widely used alternative data for corruption is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from 
Transparency International.  This index is based on a survey of individuals or organizations that have had 
first hand experience with the corruption in those countries.  This source has less country coverage and a 
shorter time span. More important, as the rating is based on a ranking of countries rather than a score, year-
to-year comparison is impossible; so that it is not suitable for panel data estimation. 
9 See Political Risk Services (2006) 
10 In the original data, the bureaucratic quality index was changed after 1997 from a 0-6 scale to a 0-4 
scale.  To create a reasonably continuous time series, we multiply the 1998-current values by 1.5 to 
conform to the old 0-6 scale. 
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Similarly, the Rule of Law index is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the 
legal system and the degree to which the law is observed by the populace. 
 
Description of Other Variables 
The data sources for the remaining variables of our estimation are as follows.  For 
the dependent variable (the currency to M2 ratio), the currency and M2 measures are 
drawn from International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD-
ROM (2006).  Currency is defined as the notes and coins held outside banks (IFS item 
line 14), and M2 consists of money (IFS item line 35) plus quasi money (IFS item line 
35b).  The interest rate measure used is the bank deposit rate.  The exchange rate 
depreciation rate is calculated from the yearly average exchange rate.  The data for the 
bank deposit rate and the exchange rate are also drawn from IFS CD-ROM (2006).  We 
use different measures of the tax rate: the total tax rate, the direct tax rate, the indirect tax 
rate, and the top bracket statutory marginal income tax rate.  The data for the first two 
measures of the tax rate are derived from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
CD-ROM (2006).  For the top bracket statutory marginal income tax rates, the data are 
drawn from various issues of publications of Price Waterhouse (1983-1997) for the years 
1983-1997, and World Development Indicators CD-ROM (2007) for the years 1998-
2003.  The total tax rate is defined as the ratio of total tax revenue to GDP.  The direct tax 
rate is calculated as the ratio of taxes on income and wealth to GDP.  The inflation rate is 
calculated as the percentage change in the price level.  Urbanization measures the 
percentage of population living in urban areas.  The measure of the average income of the 
taxpayer is the per capita income in constant U.S. dollars.  The data for the rate of 
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inflation, urbanization, and per capita income are drawn from the World Development 
Indicators CD-ROM (2006).  Education given by the average schooling attained of the 
population 15 years old and above and derived from Barro and Lee (2000). 
 
Estimation Methodology  
In this section, we discuss the methodologies we adopt to estimate the currency 
equation.  Since we expect unobserved group heterogeneity in the cross-section of 
countries we pool in the study, we rule out the use of simple OLS at the outset.  It is well 
known that with the presence of group hetrogeneity simple OLS is inefficient.  We 
employ different panel data estimation techniques to check the robustness of the results 
across different estimation techniques and specifications.  Below we discuss fixed effects, 
random effects, and dynamic panel data methods.  We also deal with the issue of 
endogeneity in the estimation of the currency equation. 
 
Fixed Effects Estimator (FE) 
The general form of the fixed effects model we estimate is as follows: 
itiitiit uxy ++= ηβ  ,                                                                           (1.14) 
where ity  is the currency ratio, itx  is a vector of explanatory variables, iβ  is the vector of 
corresponding coefficients,  iη  is unobserved country specific (time invariant) effect, and 
itu  is the disturbance term, which is assumed to be white noise.  As noted, with the 
presence of such group heterogeneity the OLS estimator is inefficient.  However, we can 
have efficient estimates by estimating (1.14) using the fixed effects model.  The fixed 
effects estimator is efficient under the following assumptions: 
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0),|,( =iiisit xuuCov η , for all st ≠ .11 
In the fixed effects model, we need not assume that the country specific effects iη  
and the observed explanatory variables are uncorrelated since under correlation of the 
two we can still get consistent estimates.  The fixed effects estimator is simply given by 
OLS regression applied to the demeaned variables.  The procedure is as follows.  First, 
average (1.14) over time to get: 
iiiii uxy ++= ηβ  ,                                                                              (1.15) 
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Now, for each t, subtract (1.15) from (1.14) and get: 
iititiit uuxxyy −+−=− )(β  .                                                              (1.16)  
As can be seen from (1.16), the individual (unobserved) country effect iη  is removed, 
and simple OLS can now be applied to this equation to get consistent estimates of iβ . The 
shortcoming of this demeaning procedure is that we cannot include variables such as 
country dummy or any other variable that is constant over time.  
 
Random Effects Estimator (RE) 
 Unlike the fixed effects model, the random effects model assumes that the 
unobserved country specific effect is random across time and unit groups, and further 
                                                 
11 It can also be assumed that conditional on itx and iη , itu  is i.i.d and ),0( 2uN σ .  This is a strong 
assumption, but it is convenient to have an estimator that is normally distributed, and with exact t and F 
distributions for small samples.  Otherwise, we have to rely on large N and small T (e.g., to rely on 
asymptotic approximation) to have an estimator with normal distribution. 
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assumes that the country specific effect is uncorrelated with the observed explanatory 
variables, which implies that the composite error term itiit uv +=η  is uncorrelated with 
the right hand side variables.  However, since iη is in the composite error in each time 
period, the itv are serially correlated across time, with 
stvvCor
u
isit ≠+= ,)(),( 22
2
σσ
σ
η
η ,                                                         (1.17) 
where )var(2 iηση =  and )var(2 itu u=σ .  Because of the presence of serial correlation of 
the composite errors, the random effects model uses the GLS technique to yield efficient 
estimators.  The assumption of uncorrelated country specific effects and the right hand 
side variables allows us to include time constant variables. However, if the two are 
correlated, the random effects estimates of iβ  are inconsistent.  As in standard GLS 
estimator, the random effects estimator is given by: 
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where )(ˆ 'itit vvE≡Ω . 
In our estimation, we compare the FE and RE estimates to check whether the FE 
estimate or the RE estimate is appropriate.  This is done by using the Hausman (1978) 
specification test.  The test procedure is simple:  if there is evidence of the existence of 
correlation between iη and itx , then the RE is inappropriate. The null of the Hausman test 
is that there is no correlation between iη and itx . Under the null, both FE and RE are 
consistent; under the alternative only FE is consistent.  Thus, a rejection of the null can be 
taken as the evidence that the RE is inappropriate.  If the null is not rejected, however, it 
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is more appropriate to use RE because it is more efficient than FE.  The Hausman statistic 
H is given as follows: 
[ ] )()var()var()'( 1 REFEREFEREFE AAH ββββββ −−−= − .               (1.19) 
Under the null, H has a 2Kχ  distribution asymptotically, where K  is the number of 
explanatory variables excluding the fixed effects, and Avar(.) denotes the asymptotic 
variance of the expression in the parenthesis. 
 
IV Estimation (2SLS) 
In the above discussions, the FE and RE models assume no correlation between 
itu  and tix ; that is, the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous.  Under the 
assumption of endogeneity of the explanatory variables, the FE and RE are no longer 
consistent.  Endogeneity may spring from simultaneity or from measurement error in the 
right hand side variables.  The problem of endogeneity, whatever its cause, can be dealt 
with by using appropriate instruments for the endogenous variables.  In our case, we 
suspect that both of our variables of interest, the tax rate and enforcement strength 
measures are endogenous.  This might be the case particularly when the tax rate measure 
is tax revenue per GDP.  We expect that this variable is measured with error since the tax 
revenue is calculated with the presence of tax evasion.  Moreover, this tax rate is not what 
taxpayers face when they contemplate to evade taxes.  Similarly, the measure of 
corruption, quality of bureaucracy, or rule of law depends to a large extent on the 
presence of the opportunity for violations.  Higher corruption or lower quality of 
bureaucracy in tax administration leads to higher tax evasion.  It is also possible that 
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higher opportunity of tax evasion also causes corruption to increase and bureaucratic 
quality to deteriorate. 
We try to detect, and correct for the endogeneity problem using two approaches.  
The first approach is to employ the 2SLS estimator and detect the endogeneity problem 
using Hausman (1978) specification test.  The second approach is to use the dynamic 
panel data model.  The latter method is discussed in detail in the next section. 
In the 2SLS method, the Hausman test is based on comparing two estimators.  
The comparison entails checking if estimates from an efficient estimator (such as OLS 
estimator) are statistically similar to estimates from a consistent estimator (such as IV 
estimator).  If the two estimators are not similar, the efficient estimator is most likely 
inconsistent, which means there is endogeneity problem.  Let Eβ  be an estimator that is 
consistent and asymptotically efficient when the null hypothesis 0H  is true, but 
inconsistent when the null is false; and let Cβ  be an estimator that is consistent under 
both 0H  and the alternative hypothesis.  When 0H  is true, the asymptotic distribution is 
such that )ˆvar()ˆ,ˆ( ECECov βββ = .  This implies the following: 
=− )( CEVar ββ )()( EC VarVar ββ − . 12                                              (1.20) 
We can use this relationship to test, for instance, if the estimates from least squares ( Eβ ) 
and the estimates from IV model ( Cβ ) are the same.  In this case, 0H  is that the true 
residuals are uncorrelated with the regressors.  All we need for this test are the point 
estimates and consistent estimates of the variance matrices. Testing one of the 
                                                 
12Note that )()(),(2)()()( EVarCVarCECovCVarEVarCEVar ββββββββ −=−+=− . 
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coefficients can be done by a t-test, while testing all coefficients can be done using a 2χ  
test.  The 2χ  is based on the relationship that: 
21' ~)ˆˆ()ˆˆ()ˆˆ( jCECECE Var χββββββ −−− −                                  (1.21) 
where j equals the number of regressors that are potentially endogenous.  An ideal 
instrument has the property that it is correlated with the endogenous variable it 
instruments and not correlated with the error term.  Again, we use legal origin dummies, 
distance of the country from the equator, and indices of political rights and civil liberties 
as instruments. 
 
Dynamic Panel Data Estimation 
 When there is persistence in the dependent variable and the explanatory variables 
are endogenous we need to use a dynamic panel data estimation method because under 
these conditions the FE, the RE, and also the 2SLS yield inconsistent estimates.  The 
dynamic panel data method is useful in that it provides for internal instruments. This is 
particularly important in our case since the external instruments are found to be weakly 
correlated with the endogenous variables. 
This method was developed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982), and later extended by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  The method uses internal and 
external instruments to obtain consistent estimates of the currency equation in the 
presence of dynamic and endogenous regressors.  The method has recently been used 
quite extensively in the economic growth literature and the discussion of the tenets of the 
model that follows is derived from that literature; see, for example, Bond, Hoeffler, and 
Temple (2003).  
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The approach first entails the introduction of dynamics to equation (1.14) as 
follows: 
itiititiit uxyy +++= − ηβα 1,    for i=1,…,N  and  t=2, …,T .        (1.22) 
First differencing the dynamic equation to get rid of the individual specific effects 
generates the following equation: 
)()'()( 1,1,2,1,1, −−−−− −+−+−=− tiittiittititiit uuxxyyyy βα .             (1.23) 
By construction, the difference lag of the currency ratio )( 2,1, −− − titi yy  in (1.23) is 
endogenous.  By assumption x  also contains endogenous variables such as the tax rate, 
and the measure of enforcement strength.  Therefore, we need to introduce instruments in 
estimating the above equation to fix the effect of the endogeneity problem and hence to 
get consistent estimates.  The approach instruments the differenced right-hand-side 
variables with their appropriately lagged levels.  Under the assumption of serially 
uncorrelated errors ( 01, =−tiituEu ), the following moment conditions give the 
appropriate instruments for the differenced lagged dependent variable and the 
endogenous regressors: 
( ) 0=Δ− itsit uyE  for t = 3, …, T and s ≥ 2                                           (1.24) 
( ) 0=Δ− itsit uE x  for t = 3, …, T and s ≥ 2.                                           (1.25) 
When these two moment conditions hold, we can use the lagged levels of the variables as 
instruments for the first differenced variables.  However, when the lagged levels are 
weakly correlated with subsequent first differences, the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
differenced GMM estimator has been subject to the problem of small sample bias 
(Blundell and Bond 1998).  To deal with this problem, Arellano and Bover (1995) 
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proposed an estimator that makes use of additional information in levels.  This estimator, 
referred to as the system GMM estimator, combines two sets of equations into a system 
of equations. The two sets of equations consist of one in the first difference and another 
in the level.  This introduces an additional T-2 moment conditions given by: 
( )[ ] 01 =Δ+ −ititi yuE η                                                                         (1.26) 
( )[ ] 01 =Δ+ −ititi uE xη .                                                                       (1.27) 
The Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator uses the moment 
conditions (1.24)-(1.27) to give consistent estimates of the coefficients of the currency 
equation.  Valid instruments have the following properties: they should be correlated with 
the endogenous variables and at the same time be uncorrelated to the error term. The 
validity of the instrument is checked by conducting the Sargan (1958) test of over-
identifying restrictions to test jointly the appropriateness of the instruments.  The null for 
the test is that the instruments are valid in that they are orthogonal to the error term.  
Under the null, the test statistic is distributed ( )2 kL−χ , where L is the number of instruments 
and k is the number of parameters in the model. 
Recall that the GMM estimator yields consistent estimates only if the errors in the 
level equation are white noise.  If they are serially correlated, the GMM estimator is not 
consistent.  To test whether the errors in the level equation are white noise, we use the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) test for second-order autocorrelation in the difference 
equation.  The null of this test is that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the 
difference equation. 
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Estimation of the Currency Equation 
In this section, we present the estimation results of the currency demand equation 
as a first step to estimate the underground economy in the next section.  As we specify 
the bench mark estimation, an explanation of how the interaction of the tax rate and 
enforcement strength brings about tax evasion is in order. 
As pointed out previously, higher tax rates do not necessarily translate into higher 
tax evasion because with higher enforcement capabilities higher compliance can be 
achieved.  It can be said, however, that higher tax rates with lower enforcing capabilities 
result in higher tax evasion.  Therefore, we include the interaction of the tax rate and the 
measure of enforcement strength, in addition to including the separate effect of each of 
these variables.  The basic equation estimated is: 
,ln
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where ln  is the natural logarithm, itu  is the error term assumed to be ... dii , iη  is the 
unobserved group heterogeneity which can be random or fixed effects,  i  indexes 
countries in our sample, and t  indexes time. 
Based on the theoretical model, the expected sign of the coefficient estimate of 
each explanatory variable is as follows. The sign on the estimates of the tax rate and 
enforcement measures are expected to be positive.  The sign on the coefficient estimate 
of income is ambiguous.  The interest rate as a measure of the cost of holding cash money 
is expected to have a negative coefficient estimate.  The coefficient on inflation cannot be 
signed a priori because there are two opposing effects of inflation on the currency ratio.  
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Inflation as a cost of holding currency is negatively related to the currency ratio; 
however, when the tax system is not indexed, higher inflation creates tax bracket creep, 
which increases the tax liabilities of individuals even though their real income is 
unchanged and which results in higher tax evasion and thus a higher currency demand.  
The effect of these two opposing forces renders the sign of the coefficient of inflation 
ambiguous.  The coefficient estimate on exchange rate depreciation is also ambiguous.  
Finally, the expected signs on the coefficient of schooling and of urbanization are 
expected to be negative. 
Table 1.2 gives the descriptive statistics for the variables; see the Appendix for all 
tables. The estimation technique employs panel data methods that pool non-OECD 
countries for the period 1982-2003.  The time period of the study is restricted by the 
availability of data.  The variables are averaged over a three year interval to reduce the 
noise in the data. 
Table 1.3 presents the correlation matrix for the variables.  The correlation matrix 
shows that there is not much multicollinearity between the explanatory variables except 
between the inflation, the interest rate and exchange rate depreciation.  Table 1.3 also 
gives the correlation between the currency ratio and the explanatory variables. The 
simple correlation shows that the direct tax rate and the total tax rate are negatively 
related to the currency ratio.  However, the correlation is positive when the top bracket 
statutory income tax rate is used as the tax rate.  Further the enforcement strength 
measures are positively related to the currency ratio.  A simple correlation coefficient 
between variables indicates the linear relationship between two variables without 
controlling for the effect of other potential explanatory variables.  Because of this, we 
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further investigate the relationship between the explanatory variables and the currency 
ratio using regression analysis. 
Turning to our regressions, we present various results using different estimation 
methods.  The methods are the fixed effects (FE), the random effects (RE), the two-stage 
least Squares (2SLS) and the dynamic panel data models (DPD).  Since we expect 
persistence in the dependent variable and endogeneity of explanatory variables, our 
preferred method is the dynamic panel data model, and hence a detailed explanation of 
the results of our estimation of the currency equation and of the underground economy is 
based on this model.  However, we also present the results of the other estimation 
models. 
For each estimation technique, we report various set of regressions by varying the 
measures of the tax rate used.  These measures are the direct tax rate, total effective tax 
rate, and statutory tax rate.  The enforcement strength is proxied by a composite index 
constructed by averaging the indices of corruption, the quality of bureaucracy, and the 
rule of law. 
 
Fixed and Random Effects Estimation Results 
We look into the results of using the two traditional methods of panel data 
estimation: fixed effects and random effects models.  Tables 1.4 to 1.9 give these results 
for the currency equation with standard errors of the estimates in parenthesis.  The results 
of both models are qualitatively similar, so we discuss only one of the estimators.  The F-
statistics for these estimations (which are not reported here) show that the joint 
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explanatory power of the regressors is highly significant.13  Table 1.4 reports the 
estimates when the direct tax rate is used as the tax burden measure.  As can be seen from 
these results, the tax rate is either not significant or not of the expected sign when it is 
significant.  The interaction term of the tax rate and enforcement parameter is significant 
and positive as expected in specifications (2)-(4), although this result is derived when the 
separate effect of the tax rate is negative.  Specifications (5)-(7) which do not include the 
separate effect of the tax rate and the enforcement variable yield negative coefficient 
estimates for the interaction term.  Table 1.5 reports FE results when the total tax rate is 
used as tax burden measure. The results are qualitatively similar to the results of Table 
1.4. 
The above tax rates are not the tax rates that taxpayers face since they are 
simultaneously determined with tax evasion.  Given this, the statutory tax rates are able to 
gauge the tax burden that the taxpayers face.  Therefore, we estimate similar equations 
using the statutory tax rates as the measure of tax burden.  The particular statutory tax 
rate we use is the top bracket marginal income tax rates.  The use of this tax rate 
obviously has its weaknesses in that few taxpayers fall into this tax bracket.  However, it 
captures the general burden and the stance of tax rate policy of a country. 
The results of using this tax rate are reported in Table 1.6 and Table 1.9 of the 
fixed and random effects estimations, respectively.  The estimates on the tax rate are 
negative except in one specification in which the estimate on the interaction term is 
negative i.e., when the tax rate is significant, the interaction term is negative; or when the 
interaction term is significant and of the expected sign, the separate effect of the tax rate 
                                                 
13 The F-statistics are also highly significant for the 2SLS and dynamic panel data models that we discuss 
later. 
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is not of the expected sign.  However, in the specifications in which only the interaction 
term is used as the tax evasion factor, its estimate is highly significant and positive.   
Turning the results on other variables’ estimates, Table 1.6 and Table 1.9 show 
that the estimate on income is negative and highly significant in all these regressions.  
The estimate on the rate of interest is negative as expected and significant in a majority of 
specifications.  The estimate on the inflation rate is consistently negative, but is not 
significant in some specifications.  The degree of urbanization is of the expected sign and 
is highly significant in the FE estimations, while it is insignificant in the majority of 
specifications in the RE estimations.  Education is significant and its estimate has the 
expected sign in the majority of specifications of the RE model, but it is not significant in 
the FE estimations. 
Our estimation also reports the use of regional and financial crisis dummies.  
Recall that the currency ratio can be affected by the stability of the financial sector.  The 
more unstable the financial system, the less demand for domestic currency and the more 
demand for foreign assets.  This results in the decline of the demand for domestic 
currencies in the form of cash and M2.  The overall effect on the currency to M2 ratio is 
therefore ambiguous.14 
We use a dummy constructed from the threshold of the inflation or the exchange 
rate depreciation variables as the measure of the financial instability.15  We have already 
included the inflation rate and the exchange rate depreciation in the above regressions.  
                                                 
14To examine this ambiguity we use the currency to GDP ratio as an alternative dependent variable.  During 
a financial crisis, GDP may also decline but only with a lag.  Hence, for the relationship we are examining, 
the currency to GDP ratio is a better regressand than the currency to M2 ratio.  When the currency to GDP 
ratio is used, the expected sign on the financial crisis measure is negative.  However, the regression results 
(which are not reported here) do not corroborate this expectation and the overall results on the other 
variables are also poor in terms of model fit. 
15We follow Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003) in defining crisis episodes of countries. 
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These can gauge the instability in the financial sector.  However, the relationship between 
inflation (or exchange rate depreciation) versus the degree of financial instability may not 
be linear i.e., the instability may occur only beyond some threshold.  Thus we use a 
dummy variable constructed from the inflation rate or the exchange rate depreciation rate 
threshold rather than using these variables in their continuous form. 
The dummy of inflation crisis has a value of 1 if the inflation rate for a given 
period is greater than some threshold and 0 otherwise.  The threshold is taken to be an 
inflation rate one standard deviation from the mean i.e., 593 percent.  The regression 
result with the inclusion of this dummy is reported in Columns (6) and (7) of Tables 1.4 
to 1.9 of the FE and RE models.  The results show a positive and significant estimate on 
this dummy variable.16 These tables also show the results when a crisis dummy is 
constructed from exchange rate depreciation threshold.  The threshold for depreciation 
rate is taken also to be the depreciation rate 1 standard deviation from the mean i.e., 460 
percent.  Thus, the dummy has a value of 1 for depreciation rate greater than this 
threshold and 0 otherwise.  The result of using this financial crisis dummy is also similar 
to the inflation crisis dummy: the estimate is positive and significant.  
The other dummy variable included is a measure of regional differences between 
countries.  Here we include a dummy variable for African and Asian countries.  For the 
African dummy, the value is 1 when the country is an African country and 0 otherwise.  
Being time constant, the regional dummies are not included in the FE model.  The 
regression results show that the African dummy is negative but is significant only in 
some of the regressions.  The Asian dummy, however, is negative and significant  in all 
specifications of the RE model.  The negative coefficients imply that the currency ratio is 
                                                 
16This result is unchanged when currency to GDP ratio is used as the dependent variable. 
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lower for countries in Africa and Asia than for countries in other regions.  The currency 
ratio is also much lower in Asian than in African countries. 
Finally, we include a dummy variable measuring the degree of mining production 
in the country.  The rationale for including this dummy variable is that, in developing 
countries where the mining sector is bigger relative to other activities, the dependence of 
the government on this sector for revenue is higher.  Since this sector is more organized 
than other sectors in these countries, it is easier for the government to collect taxes 
implying that compliance will be higher.  However, data on mining production per GDP 
that is ideal for the purpose at hand are not available.  We find a measure that proxies 
some aspect of mining.  The variable is ore exports as a percentage of total merchandize 
export.  The data are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators CD-
ROM (2006).  We define a dummy based on this variable.  This dummy has a value of 1 
when the ratio of ore exports to total merchandize export is greater than a threshold and 0 
otherwise.  The threshold is 20 percent, which is one standard deviation from the mean.  
The regression result that includes the mining dummy is given in Columns 6 of Table 1.4 
to 1.19, and the coefficient estimate is insignificant. 
Having shown the results of the two traditional panel data estimators, we test 
whether the FE or the RE estimator is appropriate for the data at hand.  As discussed 
before, if the unobserved country specific effect is correlated with the observed 
explanatory variables, the RE model yields inconsistent estimates while the FE estimator 
still yields consistent estimates. 
To check whether the FE or the RE is appropriate, the Hausman (1978) 
specification test is undertaken.  The task here is to check whether there is statistically 
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significant difference between the FE  and RE coefficients.  If there is, then FE is taken to 
be more appropriate since it is consistent under the null (i.e., no correlation between the 
country specific effects and the explanatory variables) and also under the alternative 
hypothesis.  But if the null of the Hausman-test is not rejected, then RE method should be 
used because it is more efficient than the FE estimator. 
Table 1.10 reports the results of the Hausman test for the corresponding FE and 
RE models when the statutory tax rate is used.  As the p-value of the test statistic shows, 
except in one specification, the null hypothesis that there is no systematic difference 
between the FE and RE estimators is rejected at 5 percent significance level.  Rejecting 
the null implies that the FE is more appropriate than RE. 
 
IV (2SLS) Estimation Results 
In trying to understand economic relationships, one should realize that many 
economic variables evolve together and few economic variables are endogenous.  The 
problem of endogeneity is likely to be present in our estimation for several reasons.  
Some of our measures of the tax rate are different from what consumers actually face.  
The two tax rates used in the estimation are calculated as the ratio of actual revenue from 
a given tax base to GDP.  That is, there appear to be errors in variables that possibly 
create the problem of endogeneity due to measurement error.  The effect of this type of 
endogeneity can be corrected by using instrumental variable estimation or by finding a 
more appropriate tax rate measure such as statutory marginal tax rates.  Second, the tax 
rate measures (including statutory marginal income tax rates) can be endogenous because 
of simultaneity with the tax evasion.  Countries with higher tax evasion may set their tax 
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rates low to encourage compliance because lower tax rates might be optimal with lax tax 
administration.  This is the endogeneity problem due to simultaneity between the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables.  Finally, endogneity may be present 
because other omitted may determine the tax rate or the enforcement variable. 
We correct for the effects of the endogeneity problem using instrumental variable 
(IV) estimation methods.  A good instrument has the property that it is highly correlated 
(but not perfectly) with the endogenous variable it instruments but uncorrelated with the 
error term.  No one has addressed the problem of endogeneity problem in currency 
equation studies.  We follow other work in selecting the potential instruments for the tax 
rate and enforcement variables.  These instruments are legal origin, distance from the 
equator, and indices of political rights and civil liberties. The first stage regressions (not 
reported here) show that the instruments have joint explanatory power on the endogenous 
variables; however, on an individual basis, the instruments are not robustly correlated 
with the endogenous variables. 
The results of 2SLS estimation when these instruments are used are presented in 
Tables 1.11 to 1.13 for the different tax rate measures.  The results are similar to the FE 
and RE estimations, but the sizes of the estimates (particularly for the tax evasion 
variables) are now larger.  For the other variables, we have mixed results; while income 
retains the sign of its earlier estimate, the significance of the estimate is not robust.  The 
inflation rate is not significant, and urbanization is also insignificant. 
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Dynamic Panel Data Estimation Results 
When there is persistence in the dependent variable and explanatory variables are 
endogenous, neither the two traditional panel data methods (FE and RE models) nor the 
2SLS yield consistent estimates.  It is imperative that we look for an estimator that deals 
with the problem of persistence and endogeneity of the variables at the same time.  The 
dynamic panel data estimation technique corrects for the effects of both of these 
econometric problems. 
The attractiveness of this method over the other estimation methods is that it does 
not require external instruments to deal with the problem of endogeneity, but rather it 
uses internal instruments.  These internal instruments are the appropriate lags of the 
explanatory variables. The tenets of this method are explained in the methodology part of 
this essay. 
Tables 1.14 to 1.16 report the results of dynamic panel data estimation.  Table 
1.14 gives the results when the direct tax rate is used as the measure of tax burden while 
Tables 1.15 and 1.16 give the results when the total tax rate and statutory tax rates are 
used.  Before we discuss the individual estimates, it is appropriate to check whether the 
assumptions necessary for using the dynamic panel data model are met.  Recall that the 
use of dynamic panel model requires that the error term of the dynamic equation in levels 
form must be white noise which implies that the errors of its first difference are AR(1) by 
construction and that higher order autocorrelation are absent.  Our results corroborate this 
expectation in that the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first difference shows the 
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presence of autocorrelation of errors of first order and the absence of second order 
autocorrelation. 
The other test statistic that must be checked is the validity of the instruments used. 
The endogenous variables are the lagged value of the dependent variable and the tax 
evasion variables.  We use the Hansen test of over-identification restrictions.  The 
majority of specifications show a small Hansen test static and hence the p-value of the 
Hansen test statistic is statistically insignificant, which implies that the null that 
“instruments are valid” is not rejected.  Therefore, we conclude that the use of the lagged 
values of the explanatory variables as instruments is valid. 
Turning to the individual estimates, the lagged values of the currency ratio is 
highly significant which shows that the currency ratio is affected by its past values.  The 
significance of the estimates on the tax evasion factors greatly differs when the different 
tax rates are used.  When the direct tax rate is used as a measure of tax burden, the tax 
rate is either statistically insignificant or of the unexpected sign.  In Table 1.14, we have 
only one specification when the separate effect of the tax rate is significant and negative.  
Similarly, the interaction term is significant and its estimate positive as expected in only 
one regression of Table 1.14.  Similar qualitative results are reported in Table 1.15, where 
the total tax rate is used as the measure of tax burden. 
Better estimates are reported in Table 1.16 where the statutory tax rate is used.  In 
particular, in column (6) where the interaction term is used as the only tax evasion factor, 
the estimate of this variable is consistently significant and positive as expected, except in 
one regression.  The same table also gives the estimates for the coefficients of the other 
determinants of the currency demand equation.  Based on our preferred specification, 
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Column 6 of Table 1.16, we discuss the estimates of the other variables.  The coefficient 
on income is significant and negative.  This supports either of two notions: as people get 
richer they evade less, or as a country develops the use of currency relative to other 
means of payments declines due to increased financial sophistication. 
Turning to the estimate on the rate of inflation, inflation is a cost of holding 
currency or non-interest bearing assets in general.  In this sense, the expected sign of the 
coefficient is negative.  However, a higher inflation rate increases an individual’s 
nominal income, and, since most tax systems are not indexed, this creates tax bracket 
creep. This in turn increases the tax liability of the taxpayer even though the real income 
of the taxpayer is kept constant through a cost of living adjustment.  This increases the 
tax burden of taxpayers, and tax evasion is expected to increase, which implies a positive 
relationship between the currency ratio and inflation.  The coefficient estimate on the 
inflation is insignificant.  This may be due to the two effects of inflation canceling each 
other out. 
The rate of interest as a measure of the opportunity cost of holding money is 
expected to have a negative effect on ratio of currency to M2.  In Table 1.16, this 
expectation is corroborated in few of the specifications.  Exchange rate depreciation is 
insignificant except in one specification where it comes with a negative coefficient.  The 
use of checks is more likely in urban areas than in rural areas.  Thus, more urbanization 
will tend to lower the currency ratio.  However, the coefficient estimate on urbanization 
is significant and positive. 
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Estimation of Underground Economy 
 To estimate the underground economy attributed to tax evasion, we must have a 
positive relationship between the tax evasion factors and currency ratio.  Once such 
relationship is vindicated, it is straightforward to calculate the underground economy for 
the countries in our sample using a preferred specification. 
 In selecting the preferred specification, we made a choice first between the 
estimation methods. Since we believe that there are the econometric problems of 
persistence in the dependent variable and endogeneity in the relationships in the currency 
demand equation, we preferred the dynamic panel data estimators to the traditional panel 
data ones.  Our selection of a specific specification from the dynamic panel data 
regressions is based on the sign and significance of our variable of interest- the tax 
evasion factor- and the performance of other test statistics reported in the estimation. 
 As can be seen from Table 1.16, all the dynamic panel data specifications have 
similar results on the significance of the test statistics for autocorrelation and Hansen’s 
over-identification restriction tests.  The tests show that there is first order autocorrelation 
but not higher order ones, and the Hansen’s test statistic for all specifications shows that 
the instruments used are exogenous and confirm that they are valid instruments for the 
endogenous variables. 
Based on the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients of the explanatory 
variables and particularly of the tax evasion variables, we select equation (6) of Table 
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1.16 as the preferred specification for calculating the underground.  For this specification, 
the short-run estimate on the tax evasion factor is about 0.22 and its long-run value is 
1.10. 
Using long-run coefficient values of the estimates of the preferred equation and 
following the Tanzi (1980) procedure, the underground economy is estimated as follows.  
First the predicted value of currency ratio with the presence of tax evasion (denoted 
by *itZ ) is computed. This is compared with the predicted value of the currency ratio when 
the tax evasion factors are assigned the value of zero (denoted, *0Z ). 
Now, since *)2/ln(* itMitCitZ = , this can be rewritten as )2ln
*exp( itMitZitC +=  
)*exp(2 itZitM= .  Thus, with a given level of M2, it is possible to calculate the total 
amount of currency explained by all factors of currency ratio (including the tax evasion 
factor).  Similarly, )*0exp(2)2ln
*
0exp(0 ZitMitMZC =+= , which is the predicted 
amount of currency excluding the effect of tax evasion factors.  Thus, the difference 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −=− ]*0exp[]*exp[20 ZitZitMCitC  is the stock of currency attributed to tax evasion 
(“illegal” stock of currency). 
The last step is to calculate the amount of income (transactions) supported by this 
stock of illegal currency.  This is calculated by multiplying the illegal stock of currency 
by the income velocity of money.  Here it must be assumed that the velocities of money 
in the underground and official economy are the same.  The velocity of money in the 
official economy is calculated as a ratio of nominal official income to legal 1M , legal 
1M  being the difference between total 1M  and the stock of illegal currency 0C . 
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One of the weaknesses of the use of currency equation to calculate the 
underground economy is that large yearly variations in M2 result in wide variation of the 
underground economy.  To lessen such swings in the underground economy, variables 
are averaged over the three panel periods.  The result of this exercise is reported in Table 
1.17 for 56 countries of our sample.   The table shows substantial underground economy 
and a wide variation across the countries.  The mean underground economy for the 
sample is 16 percent and the standard deviation is 14 percent.  The lowest figure of 
underground economy as a percent of the official economy in our sample is for Latvia at 
about 2 percent, and the highest one is for Tanzania at about 67 percent of the official 
economy. 
Next we compare our result to other similar studies.  Koyame (1996) estimates the 
underground economy of eight Sub-Saharan African countries.  Our study is closely 
related to her study in that she uses panel data methods in his estimation and more 
importantly she uses the same method of estimating underground economy i.e., the 
currency demand method.  Her estimates of underground economy percentage of GNP 
from his Table 6.3 are replicated in Table 1.18 along with our estimates.  As can be seen 
from the table, her estimates are very small. 
We also compare our estimates with the estimates of Schneider (2004), who 
estimated shadow (underground) economies of 145 countries for the period 1999-2003 
using the MIMIC method.  Table 1.19 reports his estimates for those countries that are in 
our sample.  His estimates generally show higher underground economy as percentage of 
GDP than ours.  Table 1.20 gives a descriptive statistics of his estimates and of ours.  The 
mean of underground economy of his estimates is about 39 percent of GDP compared to 
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ours of about 17 percent (when our sample is restricted to those that are included in his 
sample). The standard deviation of Schneider’s estimates is about 13 percent compared to 
ours at about 15 percent. 
The comparison of the estimates is also presented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2.  Fig 1.1 
shows a simple relationship between our estimates and Schneider’s.  As is depicted in the 
figure, few countries lie in the 450 line, implying that the absolute estimates of the two 
studies diverge for many countries.  However, we find that the two estimates are 
comparable in terms of their correlation i.e., a country that has a lower (higher) 
underground economy estimate in Schneider’s study has also a lower (higher) estimate in 
our study.  This can be seen from the upward slopping fitted line in the scatter plot of the 
fitted line.  The fit is even better when outliers are removed using the Hadi (1994) 
method of removing outliers.  Figure 1.2 gives the scatter plot when outliers that are at 
the 10 percent level of the tail of distribution are removed. The result now shows that the 
correlation between the two estimates of the underground economies is 0.9.  Note that 
only 29 countries are in the sample. 
As shown above, there is a wide difference in the mean of the underground 
economy between our estimates and that of Schneider’s.  The difference emanates from 
the difference in the method of estimating of the underground economy.  Schneider uses 
the MIMIC model while our study uses the currency demand method.  The difference has 
also to do with what part of underground each study is trying to measure. We measure the 
underground economy only due to tax evasion activity while Schneider’s study calculates 
the underground economy due to tax evasion, government regulation, and provision of 
public services by the government. 
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These differences do not mean that his estimates are more reliable than ours.  
First, in the MIMIC method adding additional variables as causes of the underground 
economy always increases the size of the underground economy since the latter is a direct 
transformation of the causal variables.  The other weakness of his study is that he does 
not control for enforcement strength of the tax authorities. 
  
 
59
Conclusion 
This essay is concerned with estimating the underground economy in developing 
countries using the currency demand method.  We first estimate the currency demand 
equation in a cross-section of non-OECD countries as a first step to estimate the size of 
tax evasion in these countries.  Unlike past studies, we add measures of tax enforcement 
strength to the tax rate as tax evasion factor to have at an estimation that is consistent 
with the theory of tax evasion. 
Our empirical investigation finds that the currency to M2 ratio tends to be higher 
the higher the economic return from underreporting and the weaker the enforcement 
strength of the tax authorities, after controlling for other determinants of currency 
demand.  The control variables are per capita income, the interest rate, inflation, degree 
of urbanization, level of education, and exchange rate changes.  We proxy the 
enforcement strength by measures of corruption, quality of bureaucracy, and rule of law.  
We employ different panel data estimation techniques to estimate the currency demand 
equation.  Of special significance is the use of dynamic panel data technique to deal with 
the endogeneity problem in the estimation; this method also accounts for the dynamics in 
currency demand equation.  
After estimating the relationships in the currency equation, we estimate the 
underground economy of the countries in the sample.  We use the Tanzi (1980) approach 
in separating the legal and illegal stock of currency and converting the latter into the 
value of illegal economic activity.  The results of our calculation show that the 
underground economy shows wide variation among the countries in the sample, and in 
many of these countries the size of the underground economy is substantial.  
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ESSAY II:  EVOLUTION OF THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY IN SOUTH 
AFRICA: A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
Tax evasion is a growing public concern in many countries.  In addition to the 
direct loss of revenue to the government, tax evasion causes an underground economy, 
which in turn may hamper the growth of the official economy.  This problem is more 
severe in developing countries where tax administration is more important than tax rate 
policy (Casanegra de Jantscher 1990).  Thus, reducing the underground economy is a 
timely policy issues in many of these countries. 
Policy makers aiming at reducing the underground economy need an estimate of 
its size and also its main causes. There are many studies that estimate the underground 
economy for many countries.  A notable feature of these studies, however, is that they 
focus on developed countries despite the issue’s enormous significance for developing 
countries. 
Reducing tax evasion is one of the main policy goals in South Africa.  In 1994, 
the country embarked on a series of economic reforms aimed at rapid economic growth, 
increased employment, and an equitable distribution of income.  A number of policies 
have been formulated on fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies to realize these 
objectives.  Of particular interest is the comprehensive fiscal reforms undertake by Katz 
Commission.  One of the objectives of this tax reform is to formulate tax policy so as “to 
avoid permanent increase in the tax burden” (South African Ministry of Finance 1996). 
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To reduce tax evasion policy makers need a reliable estimate of the extent of tax 
evasion.  There are some estimates of underground economy for the South African 
economy (Kirsten 1988; Abedian and Desmidt 1990; Kantor 1989; Saunders and Loots 
2005).  In particular, Saunders and Loots (2005) report a yearly estimate of the 
underground economy for an extended period using the currency demand method of 
measuring underground economy. 
However, the estimates of Saunders and Loots (2005) have some limitations that 
make further investigation of the issue necessary.  Saunders and Loots (2005) use Tanzi’s 
(1980) currency demand method but with two causes of the underground economy: the 
tax rate and a measure of the degree of government regulation.  Having found a negative 
coefficient on the tax rate, the study attributes the underground economy in South Africa 
to government’s regulatory activity.  Moreover, this study shows that the South African 
underground economy is declining or remaining constant at lower level.  The policy 
implication of having a negative coefficient on the tax rate is that government cannot gain 
increased compliance by reducing the tax rate.  This result is against some evidence done 
on other countries (Clotfelter 1983) and peoples’ intuition regarding the relationship 
between the tax rate and tax evasion.  The other weakness of the study is that it uses a 
simple OLS regression corrected for autocorrelation of errors while there is a unit-root in 
the variables.  The OLS regression is an inappropriate estimation procedure in the 
presence of a unit root in the variables. 
Therefore, in this study we provide a time series estimate of the underground 
economy in South Africa by giving attention to the complications that might arise due to 
unit root problem in the variables.  In particular, we use the cointegration method to 
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estimate the currency equation.  We also check whether the tax reform of 1994 has 
brought about the desired result of reducing tax evasion in South Africa after its 
implementation. 
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the 
literature focusing on those studies of underground economy of South Africa.  Then we 
estimate the currency equation in section III and also report the estimates of the 
underground economy in South Africa.  Section IV concludes. 
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Literature Review 
Essay I extensively reviews the literature on tax evasion and currency demand 
method.  The review here focuses on those studies of tax evasion and underground 
economy in the Republic of South Africa. 
Like in most developing countries, there are not many studies that estimate the 
extent of underground economy in South Africa.  Kirsten (1988) is the earliest attempt to 
provide an estimate of the underground economy of South Africa.  Using the labor 
market approach, the study puts the estimate of the underground economy at 6.5 percent 
of GDP.  This estimate differs substantially from the estimate of Kantor (1989) who puts 
the underground economy at 40 percent using the Feige (1979) transaction demand 
approach.  Abedian and Desmidt (1990) present a time series estimate of the informal 
economy using the labor market approach and estimate the size of the informal economy 
in the range of 6 to 12 percent for the period 1970 to 1988.  Finally, Saunders and Loots 
(2005) using the currency demand method of the Tanzi (1980) report a time series 
estimate of the informal economy for the period 1967-2002.  They use least squares 
autoregressive estimation and estimate the underground economy in the range of 7.2 to 
12.5 for the period, with a declining trend over time. 
The currency demand method of estimating the size of tax evasion or the 
underground economy has been applied for various countries but mainly for developed 
ones.  The dearth of estimates of the underground economy for developing countries is 
partly because of data inadequacies. Data for an extended period of time that enables one 
to undertake valid time series tests are usually unavailable in these countries.  However, 
this limitation on data is being relaxed.  The development and wide application of some 
  
 
64
improved time series estimation methods have also made it possible to remedy some of 
the econometric problems that plague the currency demand approach.  A recent example 
is the study by Giles (1999), who has addressed the criticism of assuming the same 
velocity of money in the underground and official economy. 
Another objection to the time series application of currency demand approach is 
that a country’s currency may be held outside its borders.  This is common for hard 
currencies such as, among others, the U.S. dollar and the Euro.  For such currencies, 
changes in currency outside banks are not necessarily related to tax evasion activities or 
the usual factors affecting domestic demand for the currency; hence the currency demand 
equation can be misspecified.  This objection can be addressed using some countries 
whose currency is hardly used outside their borders.  Good candidates for this are 
developing countries such as South Africa. 
Therefore, this essay plans to make a contribution to our understanding of the 
evolution of the size of tax evasion in developing countries focusing on South Africa.  A 
similar study has been done by Saunders and Loots (2005).  However, the study’s 
estimation of currency equation is faulty in that it uses simple OLS corrected for 
autoregressive errors which does not consider the complications that arise in the presence 
of a unit root in the variables. Thus, we improve on this study by studying the unit root 
properties of the variables and by employing cointegration estimation.  Moreover, in 
studying the evolution of the underground economy of South Africa, we access the effect 
of the post-apartheid tax reform geared towards reducing tax evasion. 
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Data, Methodology and Results  
 
Data  
The currency demand equation used to estimate the underground economy relates 
the currency ratio (C/M2) to tax evasion factors such as the tax rate and enforcement 
parameters and other controls variables.  In this study we use per capita income, 
household consumption per GDP, the interest rate, the inflation rate, and the government 
employment index as the controls.17 
The sources of the data of this study are as follows.  We have two dependent 
variables- the currency to M2 ratio and the real per capita currency.  Currency is the coins 
and notes outside banks.  M2 includes currency, demand deposits, and time deposits.  
That tax rate measure is the effective tax rate on household income and wealth calculated 
as current taxes from income and wealth of households divided by the GDP.  The income 
measures is the GDP per capita and inflation is calculated as the ratio of current year to 
last year consumer price index.  The interest rate measure used is the predominant rate on 
new mortgage loans.  The data for the currency, the M2, the GDP per capita, household 
consumption, the interest rate, consumer index, and government employment are drawn 
from online version of South African Reserve Bank (SARB).18 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 See Essay I for details on how each variable affects the currency ratio. 
18 See http://www.reservebank.co.za/ accessed August 2006 
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Methodology 
It is well known that, in trying to estimate the relationship using time series 
analysis, a meaningful regression can be done only among those variables that are 
integrated of the same order.  Therefore, our statistical procedure starts by performing 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests; see Appendix II for all tables of this essay. The 
test studies the univariate stationarity properties of each variable to determine the order of 
integration of a given variable. 
The next step in the analysis is to test whether there is a linear relationship 
between the variables of the same order of integration.  This is done by cointegration tests 
(Granger and Newbold 1974).  The cointegration procedure entails the identification of 
stationary error processes on linear combination of the variables under study i.e., 
)0(~ Iay ε≡−− βX ,                                                                            (2.1) 
where y  is the variable being explained, a  is a constant, X  is a vector of potential 
explanatory variables, β is vector of the corresponding coefficients for X , and ε  is 
stationary random disturbances. 
 
Results 
In presenting the result of estimating the currency equation, we use different 
specifications of the relationship between the currency demand and tax evasion factors 
and other control variables, and report their corresponding estimates of the underground 
economy for the Republic of South Africa. 
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Table 2.1 gives the summary statistics of the variables used in the regression.  The 
per capita real currency holding has grown at the rate of 1.42 percent per year.  The 
currency to M2 ratio and currency to GDP ratio have declined over the period at an 
average annual rate of 1.6 and 0.58 percent, respectively.  The tax rate as measured by 
current taxes on income and wealth of household per GDP grew at an average rate of 
1.69 percent.  The average rate of inflation for the period was 9 percent, and ranges from 
a low of 1 percent to a high of 19 percent.  Government employment has increased at the 
average rate of 2.6 percent.  This variable has been used in other studies to gauge for the 
degree of government’s regulation in the economy, and is expected to increase the 
underground economy. The share of household consumption in GDP has declined by 0.4 
percent during the period. 
The Tanzi (1980) method of estimation of underground economy has been 
presented in Essay I of this dissertation.  The method is used first to investigate the 
relationship between currency demand and tax evasion factors.  After finding statistically 
significant and positive relationship between the two variables, the estimated equation is 
used to calculate the underground economy.  As a bench mark, we employ a currency 
demand equation similar to the one in Essay I, but now in time series data context: 
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where ln is the natural logarithm and t indexes time. The dependent variable is the ratio 
of currency to M2, τ  is the tax rate, Gei  is an index of government employment, y is the 
per capita income, WS  is household consumption expenditure per GDP, r  is the interest 
rate, and π  is the rate of inflation.  The currency equation does not include a variable 
gauging the enforcement strength of the tax authorities.  The corruption, quality of 
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bureaucracy, or rule of law indices used to proxy enforcement parameters for South 
Africa in Essay I are not adequate for time series analysis, and hence are not included 
here. 
We first check the degree of integration of the variables by undertaking unit root 
test for each variable.  Table 2.2 reports the results of this test, and demonstrates that all 
the variables can be considered I(1) at the 1 percent significance level.  Since the 
included variables are I(1), equation (2.2) can be estimated in first difference but such 
estimation captures only the short-run relationship among the variables, and ignores their 
long-run relationships.  Hence, we need an estimation method that captures the short-run 
as well as long-run relationship of the variables.  The Error Correction Method (ECM) is 
an attractive option.  As in Bajada (1999), the general form of the ECM model we 
employ to estimate equation (2.2) is the following: 
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where tZΔ  is the first difference of the currency ratio and tiX ,  is a vector of variables 
determining the currency ratio. 
The results of the estimation for this specification (which are not reported here) 
yield negative coefficient estimates for the tax variables.  In that case, we can not proceed 
to the estimation of underground economy.  So we resort to other specifications. 
One of the criticisms of the currency demand approach of the Tanzi (1980) is that, 
when M2 grows faster than currency holdings, the currency to M2 ratio dramatically 
declines even when tax evasion is increasing.  In such cases, the currency to M2 ratio is 
bad indicator of the level of tax evasion.  
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In South Africa, M2 has grown substantially and the unexpected negative 
coefficient estimate on the tax rate earlier is possibly due to currency to M2 ratio being a 
bad indicator of the level of tax evasion.  To avoid this problem, we use real currency per 
capita as alternative indicator to currency to M2 ratio as the dependent variable as in 
Bajada (1999). 
The results of the estimation when real currency per capita is used are given in 
Table 2.3.  The F-statistics of this regression is 3.72. Since the degrees of freedom for the 
numerator is 11 and for the denominator is 32, the  joint explanatory power of the 
regressors is statistically significant at 5 percent. 
Turning to individual coefficient estimates, the lagged tax rate is positive and 
significant as expected. The first difference of the tax rate is also positive and marginally 
significant.  This supports the hypothesis that the higher tax burden, the higher tax 
evasion and the higher currency demand, other things being equal.  The rate of interest, 
the opportunity cost of holding currency is negative and significant as expected. Per 
capita income is positive as expected but statistically insignificant in both the level and its 
first difference. 
The first lag of index of government employment is negative and marginally 
significant, but the first difference of the same variable is not significant. This variable is 
meant to gauge the degree of government regulation in the economy and is expected to 
have a positive effect on the underground economy and hence on currency holdings. 
However, the government employment index is not a good proxy for the extent of 
government regulation in the economy.  In fact, it might measure the efficiency of the 
government in its various undertaking of which tax administration is one.  An increase of 
  
 
70
the size of an efficient civil service can indicate an increased enforcement capability of 
the government; hence, this may result in higher compliance and thus lower tax evasion.  
If this is the case, then a negative estimate on sign on the government employment index 
is in line with the theory of tax evasion. 
Having established a positive relationship between the tax rate and currency 
demand, we can now estimate the underground economy.  First, restate the estimated 
equation as follows (the time index suppressed):  
uc ++=Δ ΧΒτα)ln( , 
where c is the real per capital currency holdings. τ  is a vector of tax variables (namely 
)ln( 1−tτ  and )ln( tτΔ ), Χ   is a vector of variables other than the tax variables (namely the 
intercept, )ln( 1−tWS , )ln( tWSΔ , )ln( 1−tr , )ln( trΔ , )ln( 1−tYd , )ln( tYdΔ , )ln( 1−tGei , 
)ln( tGeiΔ , and )ln( 1−tc ), α  is a vector of coefficients for the tax variables, and Β  is a 
vector of coefficient for all other variables of the model. 
Second, the estimated nominal currency holding for time t is given 
by ))ln()ln(ˆexp(ˆ 1 tttt NPCC Δ+Δ+++= −ΧΒτα , where tP  is the consumer price index, tN  
is the population, and Cˆ = estimated nominal currency holdings of the public. 
Third, currency holdings due to the other motives, other than the tax evasion 
purpose, are estimated by setting taxes to zero as follows: 
 ))ln()ln(ˆexp(ˆ 1 tttWt NPCC Δ+Δ++= −ΧΒ . 
This is the “legal currency holdings” or the amount of currency used in legitimate 
transactions.  Thus, the following expression gives the stock of illegal (i.e., tax evasion 
activities) currency holdings:  
  
 
71
W
tt CCCI ˆˆ −= .                                                                                         (2.4) 
Finally, to calculate the income that is supported by this stock of illegal currency, 
we multiply the latter by the velocity of money.  The velocity of money is calculated as 
income in the official economy divided by the legal stock of money.19 The legal stock of 
money in turn is the difference between M1 and illegal currency holdings. 
The estimate of the underground economy as a percentage of GDP is given in 
Table 2.4, and the plot of the same is given in Figure 2.1.  The estimate is between 10 and 
27 percent of the official economy.  As can be seen from Figure 2.1, the underground 
economy in South Africa first grew from the 1960s to the last half of the 1970s.  After 
this period, the underground economy has declined but not steadily.  One notable feature 
of the underground economy in South Africa in recent years is that it has shown a steady 
decline particularly since the tax reform year of 1994.  The tax reform seems to achieve 
the desired result of increased tax compliance. 
                                                 
19 This is an estimate of the velocity of currency in the underground economy.  With income in this 
economy unknown, it is not possible to know the exact velocity of money in the underground economy.  
Therefore, as in the literature, we must assume that the velocity of money in the underground economy is 
equal to that of the official economy. 
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Conclusion 
 This essay deals with time series estimation of the underground economy of South 
Africa for the period 1960-2002.  The study uses the currency demand method to 
estimate the underground economy, and makes use of cointegration techniques to account 
for the presence of unit root in the variables of the currency demand equation. 
The study also uses two versions of the currency demand method.  Usually, 
currency to M2 ratio is used as the indicator of tax evasion or underground economy.  
However, sometimes the ratio is not a good indictor of the level of tax evasion.  When 
M2 grows faster than the currency, currency to M2 ratio declines even though tax evasion 
is growing.  To avoid this problem, we use real currency per capita as the dependent 
variable.  The explanatory variables included are the tax rate, the per capita income, 
inflation, the interest rate, household consumption per GDP, and index of government 
employment. 
Our results show that real currency per capita is explained well by these 
explanatory variables. We then calculate the estimate of underground economy for the 
South Africa for the period 1960-2002.  The estimates show that the underground 
economy for the period was about 10-27 percent of GDP.  The estimates also show that 
the trend of the underground economy as percentage of GDP has also shown a declining 
trend, though the decline is not steady. 
An underground economy of 10 percent is nontrivial.  Moreover, these figures of 
the underground economy for South Africa are those associated only with tax evasion.  
These estimates do not include underground activity due to other factors such as such as 
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government regulation.  Importantly, the underground economy associated with tax 
evasion has shown a declining trend especially after the tax reform of 1994. 
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ESSAY III:  APARTHEID, COUNTRY SHOCKS, AND GOVERNMENT 
SPENDING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Introduction 
 
A notable feature of the economies of the developing countries is that the 
government plays a major role in the economy.  The economy of South Africa is not an 
exception.  In 1960 real per capita government spending in the Republic of South Africa 
was about R16 at 2000 prices.20  By 2002 this had more than tripled to R55.  During the 
same period real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) increased from R15690 to 
R21900, less than doubled (See also Figures 1, 2, and 3.)  What caused real per capita 
government spending to increase more than proportionately to that of GDP? 
Such “excessive” size of government spending is alleged to be the cause of many 
macroeconomic ills in developing countries.  High government spending with slower 
growth of tax revenue is the main cause of large government deficits.  Budget deficits in 
addition to creating internal and external imbalances reduce the perceived price of 
government services which further increases demand for government spending.  In most 
cases, such an increase in spending is sub-optimal since taxpayers discount the actual cost 
of the service they get from the government, a form of fiscal illusion (Gemmell, 
Morrissey, and Pinar 1999). 
The latter half of the 20th century was an especially turbulent time for South 
Africa.  In addition to external shocks such as those generated by the various oil crises of 
this period, the country went through the difficulties of dealing with its own transition 
from apartheid, as well as those stemming from the normal political transitions of one 
                                                 
20 The base year is 2000 for all indices. 
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administration to another.  A natural question to ask is whether these external and internal 
shocks affected in a systematic way the pattern of government expenditures. 
In this essay we examine the impact of these and other factors on real per capita 
government spending in South Africa over the 1960 to 2002 period, using an extended 
median voter model of government expenditures.  An important part of our estimation 
strategy is the correction for unit root problems that are common to time series data.  Our 
estimation results indicate that government expenditures clearly declined after the 
abolition of apartheid; that is, there appears to be an “apartheid dividend” from its 
elimination.  However, external shocks and regime changes typically did not affect 
government spending.  We also find across a wide range of alternative specifications 
those income and tax prices are strongly significant determinants of government 
spending. 
The next section reviews some of the theories of growth of government spending.  
Section 3 details our theoretical and empirical framework, including some econometric 
issues in the analysis of time series data.  Our estimation results are presented in section 
4, and we summarize our results in section 5. 
 
  
 
76
Literature Review on Government Spending 
There are many theories of government spending growth, and many begin with 
some variant of the median voter hypothesis.  The median voter hypothesis states that 
(under some conditions) government officials choose the level of government spending 
selected by the median voter.  The outcome of such choice is a demand for public 
services by the median voter that depends upon such things as the median voter’s income 
and tax price, where this price depends in turn on the voter’s tax share and the relative 
unit cost of the public good as given by the technology of public provision.21 
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) were 
among the first to develop formally and test empirically the median voter model, focusing 
on the expenditures of local governments in the United States.  Niskanen (1978) extended 
empirical tests to the spending behavior of the federal government of U.S and its 
aggregate money market behavior.  Recent use of the median voter model in explaining 
the time series behavior of government spending at a national level include Gemmell, 
Morrissey, and Pinar (1999) for the U.K., Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (2001) for 
Greece, and Christopoulos and Efthymios (2003) for a panel of European OECD 
countries. 
There are of course other theories of government expenditure determinants and, 
especially, of the growth of government spending.  “Wagner’s Law” argues that 
government spending increases more than proportionately with income; that is, the 
income elasticity of demand for government services is positive and greater than unity.  
                                                 
21  Baumol (1967) showed that the relative price of public services was likely to increase over time because 
productivity growth in service sectors is slower than in other sectors and government provision tends to 
focus on the provision of services.  This increase in the relative price of government services is often 
termed the “cost disease” of the public sector. 
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Empirical tests of this hypothesis give mixed results across country studies.  Ansari, 
Gordon, and Akuamoah (1997) find no support for a long-run relationship between 
government spending and income for South Africa.  Another theory is associated with 
Peacock and Wiseman (1961), the so-called “displacement effect.”  They argue that the 
shocks to public spending during such events as war and economic crises that necessitate 
higher spending during the shock period have a permanent effect on subsequent post-
shock spending, even after the shock is not present.  This displacement effect occurs 
because taxpayers develop tolerance to higher taxes during the shock, and thus the higher 
level of government spending becomes permanent.  Other things equal, it is therefore 
expected that a higher level of spending emerges following a shock. 
Demographic and taste factors are other determinants of public spending.  The 
median voter hypothesis includes population as an explanatory variable.  Other aspects of 
demography can also affect government spending.  For example, as the population grows 
the density of population is likely to increase as the population becomes concentrated in 
more urban areas.  Because of urbanization and its associated externalities, market 
solutions may no longer be efficient, so that government intervention and higher levels of 
government spending become necessary (Borcherding 1977). 
All of the above theories of government spending growth can be considered 
extensions of the median voter model in its empirical investigation.  A strict application 
of the median voter model for democratic developing countries may not be appropriate 
because macroeconomic factors can be important, especially in developing countries in 
which internal and external disturbances are frequent.  Rodrik (1998) argues that a more 
open economy tends to be associated with a larger government sector because the latter 
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reduces risk when the economy is more exposed to external negative shocks.  His 
empirical work finds that there is a positive relationship between openness (as measured 
by the ratio of imports and exports to GDP) and government spending, and this 
relationship is strongest when the terms of trade risk is highest. 
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Empirical Specification, Data and Econometric Issues 
 
Empirical Specification 
 
We follow Niskanen (1978) and Borcherding (1985) in specifying our empirical 
model.  The median voter’s demand function is assumed to have the following form: 
φδη myAsQ = ,                                                                                     (3.1) 
where 
Q = quantity of the public good demanded by the median voter 
s =   the perceived tax price of the median voter 
y = the median voter’s income 
m = other exogenous preference or shift variables,  
and where (η , δ , φ) are parameters of the demand function with η < 0 and δ >0 . 
Since Q and s are unobserved, we must replace them with observable variables 
before we can estimate the demand function.  Assume that the cost of Q is priced by the 
government at a unit marginal cost equal to c, and let t be the average taxpayer’s 
perceived tax share of the unit cost of public services.  Then the per unit perceived tax 
price s is given by 
 cts ×= .                                                                                   (3.2) 
Note also that cQ is the government spending per average taxpayer.  Making use of this 
and combining (1) and (2) we have: 
φδηη mycAtcQ += 1 .                                                                              (3.3) 
The variable t is assumed to be a function of the fraction of government spending 
financed by tax revenues and the total number of taxpayers, or 
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)1)((
NE
Tt =                                                                                           (3.4) 
where T is total government tax revenues, E is total government spending, and N is the 
number of taxpayers.  Note that E is equal to cQN .  Finally, it is assumed that the 
marginal cost c is a function both of the wage rate in the private sector W and of the 
numbers of voter-taxpayers N, or 
λγ NBWc =                                                                                            (3.5) 
where B is a scale parameter, )10( ≤≤ γγ  measures the “cost disease” of government 
services and )0( λλ ≤  measures the degree of publicness of government services. 
 Combining these equations, we have: 
  ( ) φδηηληγηφδηλγη myNWETkmyNBW
NE
TAcQ −+++ =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= )1()1(1 )/(1   (3.6) 
where η+= 1ABk .  All variables are now observable.  Taking logs, we get  
  )ln()ln()ln()ln()ln()ln( 543210 mWNyG βββτβββ +++++=        (3.7) 
where  ,cQG = ,/ ET=τ  ,log0 k=β  ,1 δβ = ,2 ηβ = ,)1(3 ηηλβ −+=  
,)1(3 ηηλβ −+= ,)1(4 ηγβ +=  and .6 φβ =   Equation (3.7) forms the basis for our 
estimation.  The expected sign of the estimate on the coefficient of income is positive, 
and that of the tax share negative.  Ignoring the extreme case 0=λ , if demand for 
government services is price inelastic i.e., 1|| <η , then the expected sign of the 
coefficient estimate on population is positive; if they are price elastic, then any sign on 
the estimate is consistent with the theory; and the expected sign on the coefficient 
estimate of the wage rate can be positive, negative or zero depending on the magnitude of 
the price elasticity of government services as given by estimate of η . 
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Data 
We estimate equation (3.7) with annual South African data for the period 1960 to 
2002.  The dependent variable is total government expenditures per capita in constant 
prices.  In addition, we use disaggregated government spending as alternative dependent 
variables.  We use Income is measured by GDP per capita.  The wage rate in the private 
sector is proxied by total compensation of employees in the economy divided by 
employment in mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and construction.22  The terms of 
trade is calculated as the ratio of unit price of exports to imports.  The degree of openness 
of the economy is measured as the ratio of the value of imports and exports to GDP.  All 
nominal variables are deflated by the consumer price index to get their corresponding 
quantities in real terms.  Data for GDP, government receipts and expenditures, 
compensation of employees, and population are drawn from the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) online version23. See Table 3.1 of Appendix C for the source and 
descriptions of the other variables. 
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for some of the variables.  Real per capita 
government spending grew at an annual average rate of 3.1 percent over the period 1960 
to 2002.  GDP per capita increased at an annual average rate of 0.83 percent, population 
grew at a rate of 2.42 percent, and the growth rate of our proxy for the real wage rates 
was 3.1 percent.  Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 also depict the trends of real government 
expenditure, per capita government expenditure, and government expenditure relative to 
GDP. 
                                                 
22Tridimas (1985) uses a similar measure of the wage rate in his study of South African government 
spending. 
23 See http://www.reservebank.co.za/ accessed August 2006 
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Of perhaps most interest in our estimation are various dummy variables meant to 
capture internal and external shocks.  We include a dummy variable for the post-
apartheid period (1990 to 2002), equal to 1 following the abolition of apartheid for years 
following 1990 and 0 otherwise.  As discussed in more detail later, we also include a 
separate dummy variable for the post-1994 period, equal to 1 for the years 1994 and 
beyond and 0 otherwise to account for the effect of all inclusive election.  We include a 
dummy variable (“Oil Shock”) for the oil shocks after 1973, equal to 1 for the period 
after 1973 and 1 otherwise.  We include a “War” dummy variable for the years 1975 to 
1987 to account for the period when South Africa was indirectly involved in a proxy war 
with Mozambique and Angola in an attempt to contain the spread of communism in the 
region.  This dummy has value of 1 for the period after 1975 and 1 otherwise. All these 
variables are included in our estimation to test the displacement hypothesis of Peacock 
and Wiseman (1961).  Finally, we include various regime dummy variables that embrace 
the years of administration of a given head of state in South Africa; these periods include 
the regimes of Vorster (1967 to 1977), Botha (1978 to 1988), De Klerk (1989 to 1993), 
Mandela (1994 to 1998), and Mbekie (1999 to 2001).  In all cases these regime dummies 
are equal to 1 in the years of the specific regime and 0 otherwise. 
 
Econometric Issues: Stationarity Tests 
As with all time series data, the potential existence of unit roots in the variables 
complicates the estimation of equation (3.7).  It is well known that estimating equation 
(3.7) via ordinary least squares OLS in the presence of unit root may yield spurious 
estimates (Harvey (1991)).  The appropriate way of dealing with such problems is to 
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identify first if each variable has the same order of integration and then to test if there is a 
cointegrating relationship on those variables with the same integration order.24 Thus, our 
estimation procedure starts with performing the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, 
which determines the univariate stationarity properties of the variables.  Table 3.3 gives 
the results of stationarity tests both in levels and first differences of the variables.  The 
null hypothesis is that there is a unit root for a given series.  If the null is rejected, then 
the series is stationary; if it is not rejected, then the series is non-stationary. 
The results indicate that our measure of government expenditure, median income, 
population, and wage rate variables are I(1) at the 5 percent significance level.25  The 
different tax share measures give mixed results.  Tax share as measured by total revenue 
per spending is I(0); hence it cannot be cointegrated with I(1) variables.  Tax share 
calculated from total tax revenue, income tax, and indirect tax are all I(1) and are 
therefore included in the cointegration analysis.  The existence of a long run equilibrium 
relationship is detected by running cointegration tests (Granger and Newbold (1974)), 
which for I(1) variables entails the identification of stationary error processes on linear 
combination of the variables in levels: 
)0(~ IXaG ttt εα ≡−− ,                                                              (3.8) 
where tG  is our explained variable , a  is a constant, tX  is a vector of potential 
explanatory variables, α  is a vector of associated coefficients, and tε  is stationary 
                                                 
24 If all the variables are integrated of the same order and they are not cointegrated (implying that there is 
no support for long run relationship between the variables), then one can estimate them in first difference 
form for assessing the short run relationship. Otherwise, estimating cointegrated variables just in first 
difference form removes the long run relationship between the variables. “After all, if the linear 
relationship is already stationary, differencing the relationship entails a misspecification error” (Enders 
2004, 358). 
25 Unless stated, we have taken the 5 percent significance level for including or excluding a variable in the 
cointegration analysis. 
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random disturbances.  If a cointegrated system is established, the short-run behavior of 
the variables can be assessed using an error-correction method (ECM) of Engle and 
Granger (1987). 
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Results 
Long Run Relationship 
In this section, we focus on testing the potential long run relationship between 
government spending, the median income, the tax share, the population, and the wage 
rate i.e., we test if these variables are cointegrated.  The test we use for cointegration is 
the Engle-Granger (1987) procedure. 
In all regressions, we include a basic set of regressors typically included in 
median voter models: median income, the tax share, the wage rate, and population. These 
form our “parsimonious”, or basic specification. Then we include measure of openness 
and terms of trade as additional variables, as well as various dummy variables. 
We expect the income elasticity of demand for public spending to be positive, 
while the price elasticity to be negative.  The estimate for the coefficient on the wage rate 
will be positive if the tax share estimate is inelastic, and it will be negative otherwise.  
The sign for the coefficient of population can also be either positive or negative.  We 
expect it to be positive if the estimate for the tax share is inelastic; however, if the tax 
share coefficient is elastic, then any sign can be consistent with the model, although some 
magnitudes of the estimate are ruled out. 
Table 3.4 presents the results of various specifications when real GDP per capita 
is used as a proxy for the income of the median voter.  Specifications 3 and 8 show that 
the variables are cointegrated.26  In those specifications, the estimates for the income, the 
tax share, population are significant at higher levels and also the sign and magnitudes of 
                                                 
26 The critical values for testing for cointegration are from MacKinnon (1991).  For our sample of T=43 and 
4 endogenous variables, the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical values are approximately -5.02, -4.32, -3.98, 
respectively; for 5 variables, they are  -5.42, -4.70, and -4.43; and for 6 variables, they are -5.78, -5.05 and -
4.69. 
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the estimates are as stipulated by the median voter hypothesis.  The coefficient estimate 
for the wage rate is negative, although it is not always significant.   Specifications 2, 3, 
and 4 add measures of openness, the terms of trade, and their interaction to the 
parsimonious model; and the results show that these variables are significant. 
Of most interest are the various dummy variables for internal and external shocks. 
The table reports two dummy variables related to apartheid. 1 is the dummy covering the 
period after 1990, the year apartheid was abolished. The other is for the period after 1994, 
the year when the first all inclusive election was undertaken.  They are both significant 
and their estimates have negative signs.  However, these results are derived in a 
regression that is stationary only at higher significance level.  The coefficient on the oil 
shock dummy is significant and its estimate is positive.  This supports the notion that 
there was a permanent increase in expenditures following the oil shock of 1973. 
The median voter model specifies that the income variable should equal the 
income of the median voter.  Before the election of 1994, only the white population of 
South Africa could vote; after this year all segments of the population could vote, so that 
the median voter most likely have changed after 1994.  We address this issue by using 
personal income per capita of the white population for the period 1960-94, and personal 
per capita income of the total population after this year.27 The estimation results using 
this proxy for median income are reported in Table 3.5. 
The stationarity test of all the regressions show that the null of no cointegration 
can be rejected only at more than 10 percent level of significance.  Given the results, it 
seems that the proxy is a bad measure of median income.  
                                                 
27 The data on personal income of the white population are from Burea of Market Research (2004) and are 
kindly provided to us by . The data are annual from 1990-2000 and for every 5 years for the years 1960-90 
(i.e., data are available for 1960, 65, 70, 75, 80 and 85); hence we interpolate for the years in between. 
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The above two sets of regressions have been repeated by disaggregating 
government expenditure into functional classifications: expenditures on general services, 
defense, public order and safety, community and social services, and economic services. 
Unfortunately, data for such expenditures are available only for short period span (1983-
2002) which reduces the degrees of freedom. Hence, we limit our regressions here to the 
variables of the parsimonious specification and the apartheid dummies so as to 
investigate the political transition further with the disaggregated expenditure data.  Since 
the explanatory variables are all I(1), we need also to test which of the expenditure 
classifications are I(1).  Our tests show that expenditures on public order and safety, and 
community and social services are I(1).  Expenditure on general services and economic 
services is I(0) while expenditure on defense  is I(2). Thus, only expenditure on public 
order and safety, and community and social services may be cointegrated with the 
independent variables. We therefore run the test only for these two types of expenditures. 
Table 3.6 reports the results for these two types of expenditures when real GDP 
per capita is used as a proxy for median income.  The results show that cointegration 
relationship is indicated for expenditures on public order and safety.  However, the point 
estimates are statistically significant only for the population variable and in some cases 
for the wage rate.  The estimate of post94 is negative while for that of post90 is positive. 
Table 3.7 presents similar regressions when personal income per capita of the 
white population before 1994 is used as a proxy for the median income.  There is a 
cointegration relationship indicated in all the regressions except in one case (i.e., 
specification 4).  However, only the estimate for population is robustly significant.  The 
post 1994 and post 1990 period dummies are significant and negative in the regression 
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with spending on public order and safety, but they are not significant when the dependent 
variable is expenditure on community and social services. 
We are limited by the time span of the data to appropriately examine the effect of 
political transition on the behavior of disaggregated government expenditure.  If a strict 
form of the median voter model holds, then median income that takes the white per capita 
income before 1994 would better explain government spending than GDP per capita of 
the total population of South Africa.  Moreover, given that there is a huge decline in the 
median income after abolishment of apartheid, government spending should have 
declined substantially.  What we might also expect is something similar to the 
“displacement effect” in which government spending is rigid downward.  In such cases, 
the median voter does not reduce the total demand for government spending, but rather 
changes the composition of the government spending.  To see if this is working for the 
case of South Africa, it is worthwhile to look at the evolution of the various 
disaggregated categories of government spending. 
Figure 3.4 gives the plots of per capita disaggregated government expenditures.  
As can be seen from the graphs, there is a clear increasing trend on community and social 
services, and a clear declining trend on defense spending especially after 1994.  The other 
classifications of government spending, however, fluctuated within a narrow band even 
before this period and then leveled off after this year. 
Because of the limitation of observations of the above data, we use other 
disaggregations of government expenditure for which data are available for the 1960-
2002.  These are government consumption expenditures, government investment 
expenditures, total government spending less interest payments, and expenditures on 
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transfers (both to households and businesses).  The cointegration tests using these types 
of government expenditures are given in Table 3.8.  In this table, we use the 
parsimonious specification and the dummy variables for post90 and post94 period.  Only 
transfers to households and subsidies to business are cointegrated with the median voter 
variables.  In these regressions, we also see that the post90 and post94 dummies are 
significant and negative. 
 Finally, we run the cointegration test by using different measures of the tax share: 
total tax share, total income and wealth tax share, individual income and wealth tax share, 
corporate income tax share, VAT tax share and production and imports tax share.  The 
aim of using the different tax measures is to test whether the taxpayer is more sensitive to 
a particular type of tax revenue sources than others.  Recall that the median voter model 
shows that the taxpayer calculates the cost of provision of government services by 
looking at the tax share.  It is unlikely that the taxpayer’s perception of his burden of 
different source of revenue will be the same.  For some tax revenue sources, the taxpayer 
may be more responsive (e.g., for “visible taxes” such as income or other direct taxes) 
and less responsive for others (e.g., for “less visible taxes” such as sales taxes or other 
indirect taxes).  In such cases, disaggregating the tax revenues and calculating different 
types of tax shares may improve the fit of the regressions. 
The cointegration test in Table 3.9 is aimed at this. Column 1 of this table, which 
is a replication of Column 1 in Table 3.4, uses total tax share, the tax share we have used 
so far.  This is, therefore, our “gross” measure of tax share.  The regression does not lend 
support for cointegration relationship.  Once we run the cointegration on the 
disaggregated tax share, we find some cointegration relationships.  Comparing the 
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specifications that include the individual income tax share, the corporate tax share and the 
VAT tax share (Column 3, 4, and 5), we see that the individual income tax share is more 
responsive than the corporate income tax share, and the latter is more responsive than the 
VAT tax share.  This apparently lends support to the notion that how expenditures are 
financed matters for the size of government spending. 
 
Short Run Relationship 
 Next we assess the short-run relationship between government expenditure and its 
potential determinants.  To do this, we run the error correction method of estimation on 
the specification that lends support to the existence of long run relationship.  Recall that 
there are two specifications that rejected the null of no cointegration at conventional 
levels of significance, specification 3 and 8 in Table 3.4.  We experimented with both 
specifications, and we find that the former fits the data better in estimating the error 
correction model (ECM).  By using this specification as the first stage regression, the 
ECM regression results is (p-values in parenthesis): 
 
,94)07.0(08.0)ln(.82)0.10(0- )ln()58.0(88.1
)ln(.11)0.23(0)ln(.18)0.58(01.08)0.53(0-)34.(08.0)ln(
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yG
+ΔΔ−
Δ+Δ+−=Δ τε        (3.9) 
where 1−tε  is the error term from the first stage regression.  The  0.28, R 2 = and the 
0.11  F  Prob. => .  The estimation indicates that the error correction estimate is negative 
and significant at 10 percent, and the magnitude of the corresponding coefficient shows 
that almost 50 percent of any disequilibrium in the long run relationship between the 
variable is corrected within one year. The estimation also shows that the variables of the 
median voter jointly explain the short-run behavior of government spending as the F-
  
 
91
statistics is marginally significant.  The estimation, however, does not demonstrate that 
there is a short run relationship between expenditure, median income, tax share, 
population and the wage rate, as can be seen from the high p-values of the estimates on 
the differenced right hand side variables. 
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Conclusion: Accounting for the Growth of Government Spending in South Africa 
What are the major reasons for the growth of government spending in South 
Africa in the last half of the 20th century?  We can use our estimation results to 
decompose the causes of government spending over the period 1960 to 2002. We use the 
results from the regression in Table 3.4, specification 3: 
)ln(44.0)ln(0.027-
 )ln(964.0)ln(0.731-)ln(1.20896.14)ln(
TOTW
NyG
+
++−= τ
                    (3.10) 
This specification is preferred because the residual from this relationship is found to be 
stationary and all the estimates are in accord with the median voter model.  Using these 
results, we can directly calculate the price and income elasticities of demand and 
indirectly the elasticities associated with the cost disease and the degree of publicness.  
The price elasticity of demand for government spending is about -0.73 and the income 
elasticity is about 1.21.  Since the coefficient estimate for the wage variable is not 
different from zero and given that the price elasticity is statistically significant, it can be 
inferred that the measure of the degree of cost disease is nil; and finally, the measure of 
degree of publicness is 0.87, which shows that there is some degree of publicness. 
We can then decompose the contribution of each explanatory variable to the 
growth of government spending along the methodology adopted by Holsey and 
Borcherding (1997) and Borcherding (1985).  From equation (3.10) above, the 
relationship between government spending per capita and the explanatory variables of the 
basic model, expressed in growth form, is given by: 
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                 (3.11) 
where gr(.) is the growth of a variable.  Recall that real government spending per capita 
grew by 3.1 percent, real GDP per capita by 0.83 percent, the tax share of the average 
taxpayer by 0.43 percent, the measure of the wage rate in the private sector by 3.02 
percent, and population by 2.3 percent (See Table 3.1 for these figures).  Since the 
estimate for the coefficient of the wage rate is found to be not different from zero, we 
exclude it in the calculation of contribution of government spending growth.   Using 
equation 3.11, the contribution of per capita income growth to government spending 
growth is therefore about 1 percent (or 1.21 × .83 percent).  Similarly, the contribution of 
the tax share growth and the population growth to government spending are -0.31 percent 
(-0.73 × 0.43 percent), and 2.2 percent (0.964×2.3 percent), respectively.  In total, the 
explanatory variables of the median voter model explain 2.89 percent of the actual 
government spending growth of 3.1 percent which is about 93 percent of the variation in 
government spending.  The remaining factors responsible for change in government 
spending are mainly internal and external shocks, especially the abolition of apartheid 
and the terms of trade shocks. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A.  Appendix to Essay I 
 
 
Table 1.1.  Variable Description and Data Source 
 
Variable 
 
Description Data Source 
C/M2 Ratio of Currency to M2.  Currency is coins 
and notes outside banks, M2 is the some of 
money (M1) and quasi money which 
include time deposits 
Currency and M2 are 
from International 
Monetary Fund’s 
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) (2006). 
Currency is item line 14, 
and M2 is sum of IFS 
item line 35 and 35b 
   
Taxrate1 Direct tax rate calculate as total nominal tax 
revenue from income and profits divided by 
nominal GDP  
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) CD-
ROM  (2006) 
   
Taxrate2 Effective tax rate calculated as total nominal 
tax revenues divided by nominal GDP 
WDI CD-ROM (2006) 
   
Taxrate3 Top bracket statutory marginal individual 
income tax rates 
Price Waterhouse (1983-
1997) and WDI (2007) 
   
Income A measure of the income of the 
representative taxpayer calculated as GDP 
per capita at constant U.S. dollars divided 
by population. 
WDI CD-ROM (2006) 
   
Inflation Percentage change in Consumer Price Index WDI CD-ROM (2006) 
   
Intrate The interest rate measuring the opportunity 
cost of holding currency; it is given by the 
bank deposit rate. 
IFS CD-ROM (2006) 
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Table 1.1. –continued. 
 
Variable 
 
Description Data Source 
Corruption An index on a scale of 0 to 6 that measures 
perceptions of corruption in this context is 
defined as the exercise of public power for 
private gain.  A higher score indicates lower 
expectations of corruption 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) 
(2007) published by the 
Political Risk Group 
   
Bureaucratic 
quality  
An index on a scale of 0 to 6 that measures 
bureaucratic delay and the general 
effectiveness of the government 
bureaucracy. A higher score indicates a 
more effective bureaucracy 
ICRG 
   
Rule of law An index on a scale of 0 to 6 that measures 
perception of crime, the effectiveness, 
independence, and impartiality of the 
judiciary.  In general, it measures the extent 
to which economic agents respects the rules 
that govern their interactions.  The higher 
the score, the better the performance of the 
respective country. 
ICRG 
Enf A measure of enforcement strength of the 
tax authorities constructed as average of the 
indices of corruption, Bureaucratic quality 
and Rule of Law. 
Author’s construction 
   
Political rights A country rating on a scale of 1 to 7 that 
indicates the degree of political rights in 
regard to existence of free and fair elections, 
competitive parties or other political 
groupings, an opposition that play a 
significant role in political decision-
making., and the rights of minority groups 
to self government.  A rating of 1 indicates 
highest level of political rights (closest o the 
ideals) suggested in the survey. 
 
Freedom House 
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Table 1.1. –continued. 
 
Variable 
 
Description Data Source 
Civil liberties A country rating on a scale of 1 to 7 that 
indicates that degree of civil liberties in 
regard to aspects such as the degree of 
freedom of expression, assembly, 
association, education, religion, and an 
equitable system of rule of law. A rating of 
1 indicates the highest level of civil 
liberties. 
Freedom House 
   
Schooling A measure of education attainment in terms 
of the average years of schooling for the 
total population over the age of 15 years 
Barro and Lee (2000)  
   
Urban Urbanization, the share of the total 
population living in areas defined as urban 
in each country. 
WDI CD-ROM (2006) 
   
Excdep Annual percentage change of the exchange 
rate 
IFS CD-ROM (2006) 
   
Minshare Share of ore exports in total Merchandise 
exports 
WDI CD-ROM (2006) 
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Table 1.2.  Summary Statistics 
 
Variable 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Currency/M2 4171 .26 .16 .004 .91 
Currency/GDP 3510 .08 .07 .001 .63 
Taxrate1 2017 .05 .04 .005 .30 
Taxrate2 2017 .18 .08 .025 .81 
Taxrate3 1169 .42 .13 .04 .90 
Corruption 1815 2.81 1.17 0 6 
Quality of bureaucracy 1815 2.64 1.54 0 6 
Rule of law 1815 3.12 1.35 0 6 
Income per capita 2846 4186.4 3826.7 419 26684.4 
Inflation 3417 43.3 337.9 -100 10205 
Intrate 2531 69.3 2150.1 .07 107379 
Urban 6086 40.8 22.8 1.8 100 
Schooling 2846 .72 .68 .01 3.95 
Excdep 5399 3.8 178.9 0 13143 
Minshare 2843 .1 .19 0 .99 
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Table 1.3.  Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) 1             
(2) .37 1            
(3) -.20 .00 1           
(4) -.15 .26 .45 1          
(5) .20 .18 .20 .09 1         
(6) .33 -.15 -.14 -.55 -.10 1        
(7) -.29 .13 -.05 .26 -.12 -.48 1       
(8) .12 -.22 -.21 -.12 -.06 .08 .11 1      
(9) -.08 -.43 -.19 -.14 -.17 .03 .18 .78 1     
(10) -.06 -.02 -.20 .08 -.22 -.16 .72 .23 .29 1    
(11) -.25 .13 -.12 .10 -.31 -.26 .72 .05 .10 .74 1   
(12) .10 -.22 -.20 -.13 -.04 .09 .10 .97 .79 .21 .04 1  
(13) -.23 -.27 -.05 .00 -.02 .12 -.09 .13 .17 .02 -.07 .13 1 
Notes:  
 (1)  Currency/M2 
 (2)  Currency/GDP 
 (3)  Taxrate1 
 (4)  Taxrate2 
 (5)  Taxrate3 
 (6)  Enforcement 
 (7)  Income per capita 
 (8)  Inflation 
 (9)  Intrate 
(10) Urban 
(11) Schooling 
(12) Excdep 
(13) Minshare 
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Table 1.4.  FE Estimates with Direct Tax Revenue per GDP (Dependent Variable-
Currency/M2) 
 
Variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Taxrat1 4.117 -11.03** -12.63** -12.48**    
 (7.521) (5.141) (5.216) (4.824)    
Enf .375***       
 (.138)       
Taxrat1*Enf -1.481 2.120* 2.518* 2.383** -.626*** -.409 -.421 
 (1.813) (1.260) (1.278) (1.184) (.226) (.322) (.322) 
Income -.50*** -.573*** -.521*** -.570*** -.607*** -.499*** -.517*** 
 (.101) (.100) (.100) (.091) (.091) (.120) (.120) 
Inflation .110 .116 .259*** .115* .110*   
 (.069) (.070) (.049) (.064) (.065)   
Intrate -.077** -.086*** -.045 -.112*** -.123*** .012 .005 
 (.031) (.032) (.029) (.028) (.028) (.025) (.027) 
Urban -.86*** -.925*** -.946*** -.883*** -.932*** -1.25*** -1.29*** 
 (.250) (.254) (.259) (.149) (.150) (.205) (.204) 
Schooling .006 .023 .003     
 (.102) (.104) (.106)     
Excdep .200** .222***  .247*** .267***   
 (.078) (.080)  (.070) (.071)   
Minshare      -.179 -.227 
      (.542) (.542) 
Dum_Inf      .281***  
      (.099)  
Dum_Exr       .317*** 
       (.112) 
Constant 3.650** 5.980*** 4.880*** 5.922*** 6.426*** 7.000*** 7.334*** 
 (1.527) (1.287) (1.251) (.855) (.845) (1.035) (1.041) 
Obs. 212 212 212 269 269 230 230 
Countries 44 44 44 67 67 63 63 
R-squared .55 .52 .50 .52 .50 .43 .43 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.5.  FE Estimates with Total Taxes per GDP (Dependent Variable-Currency/M2) 
 
Variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Taxrat2 1.652 -1.905 -2.336 -2.351*    
 (1.679) (1.427) (1.459) (1.341)    
Enf .418***       
 (.112)       
Taxrat2*Enf -.479 .386 .541 .437 -.129 -.120 -.112 
 (.418) (.359) (.366) (.334) (.085) (.103) (.102) 
Income -.552*** -.639*** -.575*** -.641*** -.671*** -.545*** -.567*** 
 (.101) (.101) (.102) (.094) (.093) (.118) (.118) 
Inflation .087 .083 .245*** .077 .079   
 (.067) (.070) (.050) (.064) (.064)   
Intrate -.077** -.090*** -.040 -.112*** -.119*** .016 .004 
 (.031) (.032) (.029) (.029) (.029) (.026) (.027) 
Urban -.922*** -1.07*** -1.08*** -.932*** -.940*** -1.30*** -1.34*** 
 (.243) (.249) (.255) (.144) (.145) (.194) (.191) 
Schooling .061 .078 .053     
 (.100) (.104) (.106)     
Excdep .222*** .257***  .274*** .286***   
 (.076) (.078)  (.070) (.070)   
Minshare      -.257 -.307 
      (.539) (.536) 
Dum_Inf      .236**  
      (.097)  
Dum_Exr       .313*** 
       (.112) 
Constant 4.135*** 7.129*** 5.771*** 6.786*** 7.043*** 7.537*** 7.916*** 
 (1.462) (1.262) (1.225) (.856) (.847) (.993) (.996) 
Obs. 233 233 233 295 295 253 253 
Countries 44 44 44 68 68 64 64 
R-squared .54 .50 .47 .49 .49 .44 .44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.6.  FE Estimates with Top Bracket Statutory Individual Income Tax Rate   
(Dependent Variable-Currency/M2) 
 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Taxrat3 7.461* -.970 -1.006 -1.375    
 (4.140) (1.281) (1.279) (1.022)    
Enf .822**       
 (.384)       
Taxrat3*Enf -1.526 .547* .566* .524** .219*** .303*** .256*** 
 (1.012) (.293) (.291) (.234) (.059) (.068) (.068) 
Income -.346** -.436*** -.418*** -.549*** -.552*** -.402*** -.452*** 
 (.139) (.134) (.131) (.110) (.110) (.114) (.115) 
Inflation .095 .085 .129** .101 .107   
 (.086) (.087) (.059) (.075) (.075)   
Intrate -.002 -.003 .008 -.050 -.059* .024 -.012 
 (.040) (.041) (.038) (.031) (.031) (.030) (.035) 
Urban -.767*** -.756*** -.756*** -.599*** -.561*** -.622*** -.633*** 
 (.258) (.261) (.260) (.179) (.177) (.205) (.202) 
Schooling .082 .065 .066     
 (.106) (.107) (.106)     
Excdep .066 .071  .112 .114  .283*** 
 (.102) (.103)  (.085) (.085)  (.102) 
Minshare      .305 .223 
      (.556) (.550) 
Dum_Inf      .186*  
      (.107)  
Dum_Exr       -.279 
       (.190) 
Constant -.451 3.625** 3.243** 4.246*** 4.055*** 3.273*** 3.846*** 
 (2.385) (1.448) (1.335) (1.072) (1.064) (1.103) (1.116) 
Obs. 232 232 232 322 322 283 283 
Countries 41 41 41 57 57 56 56 
R-squared .46 .45 .45 .40 .40 .42 .43 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.7.  RE Estimates with Direct Tax Revenue per GDP (Dependent Variable-
Currency/M2) 
 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Taxrat1 4.427 -14.96*** -16.44*** -18.29***    
 (7.72) (5.28) (5.33) (5.05)    
Enf .471***       
 (.141)       
Taxrat1*Enf -1.373 3.277** 3.641*** 3.938*** -.472** -.238 -.225 
 (1.868) (1.291) (1.304) (1.236) (.221) (.283) (.286) 
Income -.308*** -.368*** -.340*** -.362*** -.410*** -.326*** -.333*** 
 (.082) (.081) (.082) (.069) (.070) (.094) (.095) 
Inflation .114 .123* .265*** .134* .129*   
 (.072) (.075) (.052) (.069) (.071)   
Intrate -.074** -.084** -.045 -.110*** -.127*** -.000 -.003 
 (.032) (.033) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.027) (.029) 
Urban -.035 -.021 -.038 -.186* -.193* -.361** -.416*** 
 (.158) (.159) (.161) (.112) (.114) (.156) (.157) 
Schooling -.181** -.184** -.198**     
 (.080) (.081) (.082)     
Excdep .192** .217***  .244*** .274***   
 (.081) (.083)  (.075) (.077)   
Minshare      .164 .288 
      (.380) (.383) 
Dum_Inf      .338***  
      (.105)  
Dum_Exr       .344*** 
       (.124) 
Dum_Afr      -.152 -.198 
      (.182) (.186) 
Dum_Asia      -.647*** -.687*** 
      (.211) (.216) 
Constant -1.524 .820 -.078 1.588*** 2.021*** 2.376*** 2.665***
 (1.090) (.824) (.760) (.563) (.562) (.741) (.757) 
Obs. 212 212 212 269 269 220 220 
Countries 44 44 44 67 67 57 57 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.8.  RE Estimates with Total Taxes per GDP (Dependent Variable-Currency/M2) 
 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Taxrat2 2.241 -2.820* -3.179** -3.386**    
 (1.761) (1.506) (1.531) (1.454)    
Enf .558***       
 (.114)       
Taxrat2*Enf -.597 .625* .751* .740** -.083 -.119 -.102 
 (.438) (.380) (.385) (.364) (.090) (.105) (.104) 
Income -.321*** -.392*** -.363*** -.390*** -.431*** -.332*** -.339*** 
 (.080) (.082) (.082) (.071) (.070) (.091) (.092) 
Inflation .111 .108 .255*** .116 .118*   
 (.071) (.075) (.054) (.071) (.071)   
Intrate -.066** -.083** -.042 -.108*** -.116*** .004 .002 
 (.032) (.034) (.031) (.031) (.031) (.028) (.030) 
Urban -.040 -.035 -.035 -.156 -.159 -.422*** -.488*** 
 (.153) (.158) (.158) (.111) (.113) (.150) (.151) 
Schooling -.150* -.175** -.191**     
 (.079) (.082) (.082)     
Excdep .187** .227***  .253*** .269***   
 (.079) (.083)  (.077) (.077)   
Minshare      .113 .231 
      (.372) (.376) 
Dum_Inf      .308***  
      (.104)  
Dum_Exr       .321** 
       (.126) 
Dum_Afr      -.252 -.301* 
      (.172) (.176) 
Dum_Asia      -.740*** -.791*** 
      (.202) (.207) 
Constant -1.763* 1.109 .085 1.761*** 2.081*** 2.732*** 3.053*** 
 (.998) (.818) (.745) (.567) (.562) (.712) (.729) 
Obs. 233 233 233 295 295 242 242 
Countries 44 44 44 68 68 57 57 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.9.  RE Estimates with Top Bracket Statutory Individual Income Tax Rate   
(Dependent Variable-Currency/M2) 
 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Taxrat3 9.067** -.890 -.925 -.939    
 (4.021) (1.228) (1.224) (1.016)    
Enf .968***       
 (.372)       
Taxrat3*Enf -1.823* .634** .646** .560** .346*** .429*** .425*** 
 (.987) (.286) (.284) (.237) (.052) (.058) (.058) 
Income -.266*** -.312*** -.310*** -.348*** -.362*** -.360*** -.368*** 
 (.089) (.089) (.088) (.073) (.071) (.078) (.079) 
Inflation .104 .096 .120** .097 .101   
 (.088) (.089) (.060) (.077) (.077)   
Intrate .004 .010 .015 -.031 -.038 .014 .028 
 (.039) (.039) (.037) (.031) (.030) (.029) (.031) 
Urban -.068 -.040 -.036 -.018 -.005 -.124 -.127 
 (.147) (.149) (.148) (.126) (.125) (.137) (.138) 
Schooling .016 -.006 -.005     
 (.082) (.082) (.082)     
Excdep .042 .037  .089 .092   
 (.102) (.103)  (.088) (.087)   
Minshare      -.291 -.317 
      (.372) (.373) 
Dum_Inf      .225**  
      (.111)  
Dum_Exr       .124 
       (.125) 
Dum_Afr      -.337** -.349** 
      (.156) (.156) 
Dum_Asia      -.545*** -.545*** 
      (.188) (.188) 
Constant -4.508** -.298 -.454 .242 .269 1.113 1.167* 
 (1.808) (.831) (.730) (.649) (.651) (.692) (.704) 
Obs. 232 232 232 322 322 275 275 
Countries 41 41 41 57 57 53 53 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.10. Hausman Test Results for Comparing FE and RE Estimators 
 
Equation* 
 
df χ2 Prob(χ2) 
1 9 13.4 .146 
2 8 18.04 .021 
3 7 20.74 .004 
4 7 22.45 .002 
5 6 19.8 .003 
6 6 19.56 .003 
7 6 43.06 .000 
*A given equation refers to the pair of corresponding specifications in Tables 1.6 and 1.9. 
  
 
106
 
 
 
 
Table 1.11.  2SLS Estimates with Direct Tax Revenue per GDP (Dependent Variable-
Currency/M2) 
 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Taxrat1 -36.670 -72.581** -68.203** -66.554    
 (45.435) (30.422) (30.763) (41.025)    
Enf .684       
 (.977)       
Taxrat1*Enf 9.698 17.235** 15.410* 14.204 -2.727 -4.424* -4.123* 
 (11.694) (8.104) (8.160) (10.988) (1.750) (2.381) (2.318) 
Income -.267* -.231* -.191 -.177 -.271* -.064 -.085 
 (.161) (.133) (.135) (.141) (.147) (.234) (.225) 
Inflation -.017 .121 .241*** .136 .117   
 (.156) (.097) (.066) (.096) (.090)   
Intrate -.181*** -.067 -.040 -.082 -.114*** -.009 -.003 
 (.057) (.050) (.042) (.052) (.040) (.044) (.045) 
Urban .251** .091 .020 -.205 -.412** -.487* -.527* 
 (.105) (.178) (.186) (.166) (.185) (.278) (.269) 
Schooling -.041 -.177* -.197**     
 (.087) (.092) (.092)     
Excdep .435*** .180  .188 .264***   
 (.167) (.116)  (.118) (.098)   
Minshare      .330 .432 
      (.542) (.529) 
Dum_Inf      .301*  
      (.158)  
Dum_Exr       .273 
       (.180) 
Constant -3.064 -.666 -1.205 .336 2.049*** 1.348 1.602* 
 (4.798) (1.046) (.927) (.935) (.740) (.898) (.885) 
Obs. 198 198 198 229 229 195 195 
Countries 41 41 41 50 50 46 46 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.12.  2SLS Estimates with Total Taxes per GDP (Dependent Variable-
Currency/M2) 
 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Taxrat2 -52.70 -28.99*** -31.4*** -52.18**    
 (79.08) (8.82) (10.24) (23.34)    
Enf -1.391       
 (4.904)       
Taxrat2*Enf 13.96 7.65*** 8.23*** 13.86** .425 -.222 -.340 
 (21.113) (2.167) (2.535) (6.135) (.702) (.828) (.876) 
Income -.402 -.283** -.236 -.195 -.474*** -.410*** -.386*** 
 (.574) (.130) (.145) (.221) (.087) (.114) (.116) 
Inflation .150 .068 .218** .207 .127   
 (.286) (.152) (.100) (.202) (.088)   
Intrate -.099 -.120** -.063 -.003 -.072 .013 .017 
 (.085) (.059) (.055) (.099) (.045) (.043) (.041) 
Urban .346 .280** .246* -.028 -.230* -.089 -.189 
 (.362) (.116) (.135) (.192) (.121) (.134) (.141) 
Schooling -.166 -.123 -.166*     
 (.140) (.085) (.096)     
Excdep .164 .235  -.046 .224**   
 (.242) (.165)  (.257) (.101)   
Minshare      .280 .443 
      (.381) (.399) 
Dum_Inf      .318***  
      (.118)  
Dum_Exr       .279** 
       (.134) 
Constant 4.790 -.913 -1.980** -1.507 2.123*** 1.852*** 2.090***
 (21.430) (1.015) (.928) (1.690) (.676) (.537) (.576) 
Obs. 218 218 218 251 251 214 214 
Countries 41 41 41 50 50 46 46 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.13.  2SLS Estimates with Top Bracket Statutory Individual Income Tax Rate 
(Dependent Variable-Currency/M2) 
 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Taxrat3 56.519 -20.903*** -21.05*** -17.283**    
 (67.441) (7.878) (7.426) (7.141)    
Enf 6.832       
 (5.769)       
Taxrat3*Enf -13.651 4.955** 5.078*** 4.626*** .905*** 1.159*** 1.154***
 (16.628) (2.052) (1.951) (1.593) (.291) (.345) (.385) 
Income -.016 -.046 -.046 -.139 -.35*** -.359*** -.374*** 
 (.152) (.158) (.152) (.120) (.092) (.099) (.088) 
Inflation -.011 .002 .060 .093 .145   
 (.215) (.147) (.129) (.136) (.106)   
Intrate -.116 .023 .029 .040 .032 -.011 .034 
 (.106) (.080) (.064) (.068) (.050) (.046) (.060) 
Urban .013 -.096 -.075 .048 .384* .509** .453** 
 (.180) (.179) (.171) (.185) (.230) (.255) (.204) 
Schooling .026 -.173 -.131     
 (.130) (.190) (.169)     
Excdep .251 .100  -.105 -.137  -.042 
 (.278) (.243)  (.206) (.155)  (.245) 
Minshare      -.821 -.806* 
      (.505) (.428) 
Dum_Inf      .229  
Dum_Exr       .074 
       (.371) 
Constant -29.607 -.991 -1.447 -1.944 -2.497* -2.401* -2.175* 
 (23.661) (1.581) (1.001) (1.437) (1.489) (1.325) (1.246) 
      (.155)  
Obs. 218 218 218 241 241 217 217 
Countries 38 38 38 43 43 42 42 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.14.  Arellano-Bond GMM Dynamic Panel Estimates with Direct Tax Revenue 
per GDP (Dependent Variable-Currency/M2) 
 
Variables  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
(C/M2)t-1 .498*** .575*** .656*** .640*** .922*** .925*** 
 (.146) (.164) (.157) (.182) (.104) (.102) 
Taxrat1 24.115 19.515 -10.072 -13.872* -8.451  
 (20.670) (18.454) (7.209) (7.487) (7.592)  
Enf .672 .663     
 (.462) (.419)     
Taxrat1*Enf -5.267 -4.961 2.549 3.404* 1.870 -.189 
 (5.513) (4.994) (1.889) (1.890) (2.031) (.508) 
Income -.090 .017 .016 .166 -.169 -.210 
 (.431) (.328) (.296) (.292) (.193) (.178) 
Inflation -.181 -.084 -.053 .089 -.072 -.078 
 (.274) (.145) (.146) (.116) (.130) (.139) 
Intrate -.089 -.056 -.073 .008 -.111* -.127** 
 (.064) (.066) (.070) (.061) (.062) (.058) 
Urban -.474 -.740 -.598 -.762 .313 .350 
 (.500) (.725) (.565) (.641) (.234) (.222) 
Schooling -.278 .065 .031 .061   
 (.249) (.212) (.173) (.193)   
Excdep .450 .273 .308*  .341** .386** 
 (.275) (.164) (.168)  (.160) (.151) 
Minshare -.623      
Constant -.209 -.356 1.786 .308 .520 .758 
 (3.264) (2.675) (2.560) (2.704) (1.158) (1.163) 
 (.929)      
Obs. 116 129 129 129 168 168 
Countries 37 40 40 40 61 61 
Hansen p-
value 
.022 .015 .012 .072 .002 .002 
AR(1) p-value .137 .0148 .197 .476 .222 .174 
AR(2) p-value .885 .862 .645 .736 .510 .332 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.15.  Arellano-Bond GMM Dynamic Panel Estimates with Total Taxes per GDP 
(Dependent Variable-Currency/M2) 
 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(C/M2)t-1 .700*** .605** .653*** .636*** .829*** .853*** 
 (.139) (.227) (.173) (.209) (.125) (.122) 
Taxrat2 -2.506 -.251 -6.586** -7.215** -5.667*  
 (7.295) (7.647) (2.667) (2.958) (3.254)  
Enf .249 .377     
 (.442) (.469)     
Taxrat2*Enf .446 -.101 1.516** 1.661** 1.288 -.195 
 (1.881) (1.995) (.712) (.760) (.880) (.152) 
Income .133 .195 .149 .242 -.224 -.291 
 (.285) (.343) (.305) (.299) (.202) (.185) 
Inflation -.208 -.041 -.042 .049 .033 .092 
 (.259) (.122) (.123) (.093) (.127) (.120) 
Intrate -.061 -.015 -.048 .005 -.126*** -.160*** 
 (.057) (.077) (.067) (.052) (.047) (.047) 
Urban -.146 -.589 -.519 -.635 .313 .405* 
 (.337) (.579) (.499) (.579) (.249) (.231) 
Schooling -.353** -.019 -.036 -.009   
 (.130) (.159) (.147) (.161)   
Excdep .369 .128 .209  .294** .308** 
 (.233) (.191) (.168)  (.126) (.120) 
Minshare -.817      
Constant -.886 -1.407 .376 -.516 .370 .425 
 (2.721) (2.932) (2.403) (2.469) (.929) (.940) 
 (.925)      
Obs. 124 138 138 138 181 181 
Countries 37 40 40 40 62 62 
Hansen p-
value 
.017 .088 .014 .076 .001 .002 
AR(1) p-value .452 .316 .281 .525 .23 .281 
AR(2) p-value .784 .846 .658 .807 .23 .382 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.16.  Arellano-Bond GMM Dynamic Panel Estimates with Top Bracket Statutory  
Individual Income Tax Rate (Dependent Variable-Currency/M2) 
 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(C/M2)t-1 .557*** .605*** .598*** .597*** .802*** .804*** 
 (.166) (.211) (.217) (.220) (.100) (.100) 
Taxrat3 -5.797 4.081 -1.677 -1.620 -.833  
 (8.582) (7.515) (1.577) (1.584) (1.517)  
Enf -.411 .543     
 (.616) (.675)     
Taxrat3*Enf 1.705 -.806 .629* .616* .401 .216*** 
 (2.092) (1.919) (.347) (.339) (.318) (.078) 
Income -.026 -.284 -.322 -.326 -.363* -.394* 
 (.322) (.262) (.255) (.247) (.189) (.200) 
Inflation .163 .050 .056 .045 -.042 -.018 
 (.223) (.157) (.161) (.136) (.122) (.114) 
Intrate -.067 .008 -.005 -.008 -.022 -.033 
 (.092) (.100) (.095) (.089) (.064) (.065) 
Urban .112 -.005 .065 .068 .476 .540** 
 (.361) (.688) (.674) (.674) (.313) (.257) 
Schooling -.366** -.012 -.036 -.035   
 (.148) (.148) (.153) (.155)   
Excdep -.004 -.064 -.025  .088 .082 
 (.138) (.178) (.186)  (.156) (.154) 
Minshare .088      
Constant -.471 -1.245 .969 1.043 .622 .513 
 (3.359) (3.507) (1.671) (1.401) (1.641) (1.538) 
 (.637)      
Obs. 142 153 153 153 232 232 
Countries 41 41 41 41 57 57 
Hansen p-
value 
.021 .064 .053 .049 .003 .005 
AR(1) p-value .076 .323 .185 .172 .353 .343 
AR(2) p-value .968 .754 .755 .811 .756 .651 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.17.  Author’s Underground Economy (Percentage of GDP) 
 
 
Countries 
Underground
Economy 
 
Countries 
Underground 
Economy 
Argentina 6.3 Latvia 3.0 
Azerbaijan 14.8 Lithuania 3.7 
Bolivia 13.6 Malawi 45.1 
Botswana 7.7 Malaysia 7.1 
Brazil 10.1 Malta 5.4 
Bulgaria 8.6 Morocco 8.2 
Cameroon 39.4 Mozambique 23.3 
Chile 12.9 Nicaragua 41.3 
China 16.2 Nigeria 22.6 
Colombia 9.5 Papua New Guinea 16.8 
Congo, Rep. 31.0 Peru 9.6 
Costa Rica 4.5 Philippines 25.1 
Croatia 9.0 Poland 6.9 
Cyprus 8.0 Russia 3.5 
Czech Republic 3.5 Senegal 36.9 
Dominican Republic 6.8 Slovak Republic 5.2 
Ecuador 10.0 Slovenia 7.4 
El Salvador 20.2 South Africa 5.3 
Estonia 2.1 Sri Lanka 18.0 
Gabon 9.8 Tanzania 66.7 
Ghana 14.4 Thailand 20.8 
Guatemala 8.2 Trinidad and Tobago 9.2 
Guyana 13.3 Uganda 14.2 
Honduras 23.2 Ukraine 9.4 
Hungary 4.0 Venezuela 6.6 
Indonesia 28.5 Vietnam 25.3 
Jamaica 10.2 Zambia 58.8 
Kenya 44.0 Zimbabwe 12.5 
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Table 1.18.  Schneider’s Estimates of the Underground Economy, Percentage of GDP 
 
Country Koyame’s Estimates* Author’s Estimates 
Botswana 1.6 7.7 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 17.5 --- 
Kenya 3.5 44 
Malawi 2.3 45.1 
Niger 8.3 --- 
Senegal 10.2 36.9 
Zambia 9.4 58.8 
Zimbabwe 3.2 12.5 
*Source: Koyame (1996).  The under ground economy estimate are percentage of GNP. 
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Table 1.19.  Schneider’s Estimates of the Underground Economy, Percentage of GDP 
 
 
Countries 
Underground 
Economy 
  
Countries 
Underground
Economy 
Argentina 25.4  Latvia 39.9 
Azerbaijan 60.6  Lithuania 30.3 
Bolivia 67.1  Malawi 40.3 
Botswana 33.4  Malaysia 31.1 
Brazil 39.8  Malta --- 
Bulgaria 36.9  Morocco 36.4 
Cameroon 32.8  Mozambique 40.3 
Chile 19.8  Nicaragua 45.2 
China 13.1  Nigeria 57.9 
Colombia 39.1  Papua New Guinea 36.1 
Congo, Rep. 48.2  Peru 59.9 
Costa Rica 26.2  Philippines 43.4 
Croatia 33.4  Poland 27.6 
Cyprus ---  Russia 46.1 
Czech Republic 19.1  Senegal 45.1 
Dominican Republic 32.1  Slovak Republic 18.9 
Ecuador 34.4  Slovenia 27.1 
El Salvador 46.3  South Africa 28.4 
Estonia 38.4  Sri Lanka 44.6 
Gabon ---  Tanzania 58.3 
Ghana 41.9  Thailand 52.6 
Guatemala 51.5  Trinidad and Tobago --- 
Guyana ---  Uganda 43.1 
Honduras 49.6  Ukraine 52.2 
Hungary 25.1  Venezuela 33.6 
Indonesia 19.4  Vietnam 15.6 
Jamaica 36.4  Zambia 48.9 
Kenya 34.3  Zimbabwe 59.4 
Source:  Schneider (2004) 
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Table 1.20.  Summary Statistics, Comparison of Authors and 
Schneider’s Estimates of Underground Economy 
 
 
Estimates 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Author’s 56 16.2 14.2 2.1 66.7 
Author’s 51 16.9 14.7 2.1 66.7 
Schneider 51 38.6 12.6 13.1 67.1 
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Figure 1.1.  Regression of Author’s and Schneider’s Estimates of Underground Economy 
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Figure 1.2.  Regression (Outlier removed) of Author’s and Schneider’s Estimates of 
Underground Economy 
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Appendix B.  Appendix to Essay II 
 
 
 
Table 2.1.  Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
 
Obs. 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Std. Dev.
 
 
Min. 
 
 
Max. 
Average 
growth rate 
(%)* 
C/M2 41 .09 .02 .06 .12 -1.60 
CCAP 46 6.52 .924 4.71 8.95 1.42 
τ 46 6.64 2.06 3.48 10 1.69 
WS 46 59.51 3.23 50.68 63.66 -.004 
r 46 13.16 4.66 6.50 22.75 1.06 
y 46 168.99 35.96 97.31 244.34 2.04 
Gei 45 77.14 27.27 32.01 109.18 2.60 
π 45 1.09 .05 1.01 1.19 .02 
*The growth rate is exponential. C/M2= Ratio of currency to M2, CCAP=real currency per capita, 
τ= tax rate, WS=Consumption per GDP, r=interest rate, Gei=Government employment index,  
 y=real GDP per capita, π=the rate of inflation. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2.  Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
 
Levels First Difference 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Test 
Statistic 
Z(t) 
 
Mackinnon 
Approximate 
P-value for 
Z(t) 
 
 
Test 
Statistic 
Z(t) 
 
Mackinnon 
Approximate 
P-value for 
Z(t) 
C/M2 -3.455 .044 -5.737 .000 
CCAP -2.398 .381 -5.687 .000 
τ -2.138 .525 -7.831 .000 
WS -2.108 .542 -5.790 .000 
r -1.162 .918 -6.579 .000 
y -2.273 .449 -4.280 .003 
Gei .683 .997 -5.843 .000 
π -1.01 .943 -6.081 .000 
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Table 2.3.  Generalized ECM Estimation (Dependent Variable- Real per Capita 
Currency) 
 
Variables 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t prob>t 
(CCAP)t-1 -.666 .163 -4.08 .000 
τ t-1 .188 .099 1.89 .068 
WS t-1 -.051 .254 -.20 .842 
r t-1 -.001 .071 -.01 .992 
y t-1 .594 .199 2.99 .005 
Gei t-1 -.270 .131 -2.06 .048 
Δ τ .216 .118 1.82 .077 
ΔWS .764 .393 1.94 .061 
Δr -.041 .059 -.69 .496 
Δy 1.428 .305 4.69 .000 
ΔGei -.125 .290 -.43 .67 
Constant -2.030 1.389 -1.46 .154 
Δx denotes the first difference of the variable x.  All the variable are in logarithm form. 
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Table 2.4.  Estimate of South African Underground Economy, 1965-2002 (in Percentage 
of GDP) 
 
 
Year 
Underground 
Economy  
 
Year 
Underground 
Economy  
1965 21.92 1984 13.78 
1966 20.03 1985 18.01 
1967 19.97 1986 18.67 
1968 20.20 1987 16.06 
1969 19.27 1988 16.04 
1970 20.96 1989 18.35 
1971 21.35 1990 18.74 
1972 22.17 1991 18.38 
1973 23.68 1992 17.03 
1974 22.79 1993 16.16 
1975 23.94 1994 15.36 
1976 25.57 1995 15.93 
1977 26.47 1996 12.58 
1978 27.00 1997 12.61 
1979 24.83 1998 10.52 
1980 22.85 1999 10.71 
1981 21.16 2000 10.69 
1982 18.80 2001 10.23 
1983 15.99 2002 9.66 
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Figure 2.1.  Underground Economy for South Africa, percentage of GDP 
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Appendix C.  Appendix to Essay III 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1.  Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
 
Variable 
 
Units 
 
Data Source 
Total population Millions South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB) 
White population, as percent of  
   total 
Percentage Statistics South Africa 
White personal per Capita Income Millions of rand Burea of Market Research 
(2004) 
GDP Millions of rand SARB 
Government expenditure Millions of rand SARB 
Disaggregated Government  
   Spending 
Millions of rand Statistics South Africa 
Government revenue, taxes Millions of rand SARB 
Compensation of employees Millions of rand SARB 
Employment in mining and 
   quarrying, manufacturing,  
   construction and electricity 
Thousands Statistics South Africa 
Value of exports and imports Millions of rand SARB 
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Table 3.2.  Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable 
 
Obs.
 
Mean 
Std. Dev.  
Min. 
 
Max. 
Average
growth 
Gov. Expenditure 43 62695 83001 881 285953 15 
Real Gov. Expenditure Per capita (G) 43 41 12.6 16 56.2 3.1 
Real GDP per Capita 43 20467.35 1772 15690 23354 .83 
Population 43 30.6 8.7 17.4 44.8 2.3 
Wage Rate 43 1200.6 454.6 664.7 2332 3.1 
Openness 43 56.5 6.52 42.3 68.3 .42 
Terms of Trade 43 1071.9 113 887 1342 .29 
Inflation 42 9.2 4.8 1.28 18.7 7.4 
G1 43 27.07 9.59 9.58 41.13 3.64 
G2 43 9.48 3.79 4.24 18.19 .05 
G3 43 36.55 9.01 16.63 46.85 2.64 
G4 43 38.80 9.75 17.39 48.57 2.61 
G5 43 2.25 .98 .73 4.04 3.04 
Total revenue per expenditure 43 .85 .06 .74 .98 .41 
Total  tax revenue per expenditure 43 .84 .06 .72 .96 .43 
Income tax per expenditure 43 .48 .05 .40 .58 .93 
Individual income per expenditure 43 .27 .05 .16 .39 1.34 
Corporate income tax per expenditure 43 .21 .06 .09 .35 1.71 
Indirect tax  per expenditure 43 .38 .05 .26 .47 .72 
VAT tax per expenditure 33 .15 .08 .03 .24 6.76 
Notes: G1= government consumption; G2=government investment; G3=government consumption plus 
investment; G4=government spending less interest payments; G5=transfers to households and subsidy for 
businesses. 
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Table 3.3.  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests 
 
 Test for H0 : I(1) Test for H0 : I(2) 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
 
Test 
Statistic 
Z(t) 
 
Mackinnon 
Approximate 
P-value for 
Z(t) 
 
 
 
Test Statistic 
Z(t)) 
 
Mackinnon 
Approximate 
P-value for 
Z(t) 
Real government spending 
  per capita 
-1.46 .843 -7.81 .000 
Real GDP per capita -2.74 .221 -3.89 .012 
White population per  
  capita income 
-1.49 .832 -6.63 .000 
Population 7.54 1.000 -3.18 .088 
Wage Rate -1.55 .811 -4.09 .007 
Terms of Trade -1.94 .635 -5.24 .001 
Openness -.96 .949 -4.03 .008 
G1 -1.684 .758 -5.89 .000 
G2 -1.861 .674 -4.03 .008 
G3 -1.963 .621 -4.58 .001 
G4 -1.858 .676 -4.65 .001 
G5 -.643 .977 -6.61 .000 
Total revenue per 
  expenditure 
-3.34 .050 -6.86 .000 
Total tax revenue per 
  expenditure 
-3.32 .064 -7.09 .000 
Income tax per 
  expenditure 
-3.13 .100 -7.97 .000 
Individual income per 
  expenditure 
-2.44 .359 -5.49 .000 
Corporate income Tax per 
  expenditure 
-2.01 .596 -6.62 .000 
Indirect tax  per 
  expenditure 
-2.92 .157 -6.68 .000 
VAT tax per expenditure -1.03 .939 -3.49 .000 
All variables are in logarithm form.  The Mackinnon p-value is the probability at which the hypothesis of a 
unit root can be rejected. 
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Table 3.4.  Cointegration Results with Real GDP per Capita as the Median Income 
(Dependent Variable- Real per capita Government expenditure) 
 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
y 1.410*** 1.242*** 1.208*** 1.178*** 1.337*** 
 (.095) (.101) (.081) (.094) (.100) 
τ -.606*** -.739*** -.731*** -.777*** -.584*** 
 (.117) (.114) (.092) (.103) (.114) 
N 1.272*** 1.425*** .964*** 1.321*** 1.141*** 
 (.113) (.113) (.103) (.093) (.129) 
W -.262*** -.349*** -.027 -.270*** -.081 
 (.094) (.089) (.083) (.076) (.130) 
Openness  .253***    
  (.080)    
TOT   .440***   
   (.081)   
TOT*Openness    .036***  
    (.008)  
post94     -.079* 
     (.041) 
post90      
      
post75      
      
post73      
      
vorster      
      
botha      
      
deklerk      
      
mandela      
      
mbeki      
      
Constant -16.52*** -17.00*** -14.96*** -15.46*** -14.10*** 
 (1.237) (1.124) (.980) (1.037) (1.726) 
Obs. 43 43 43 43 43 
R-squared .98 .99 .99 .99 .99 
Tau-statistics -3.625 -3.947 -4.840 -4.259 -3.551 
Stationary at 10% 
  level? 
No No Yes No No 
      
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
£ The critical values for testing for cointegration are from Mackinnon (1991).  For our sample of T=43, and 
4 endogenous variables, the 1%, 5% and 10% percent critical values are approximately -5.02, -4.32, -3.98, 
respectively; for 5 variables, they are  -5.42, -4.70 and -4.43; and for 6 variables, they are -5.78, -5.05 and -
4.69. 
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Table 3.4.-continued. 
 
Variables 
 
(6) (7) (8) (9) 
y 1.163*** 1.337*** 1.263*** 1.382*** 
 (.134) (.085) (.078) (.193) 
τ -.745*** -.584*** -.614*** -.614*** 
 (.124) (.101) (.090) (.130) 
N 1.217*** 1.031*** .966*** 1.209*** 
 (.109) (.117) (.104) (.226) 
W -.075 -.172** -.137* .012 
 (.116) (.084) (.076) (.207) 
Openness     
     
TOT     
     
TOT*Openness     
     
post94     
     
post90 -.107**    
 (.043)    
post75  .107***   
  (.029)   
post73   .137***  
   (.026)  
vorster    -.062 
    (.048) 
botha    -.097 
    (.071) 
deklerk    -.134 
    (.090) 
mandela    -.206* 
    (.106) 
mbeki    -.269* 
    (.137) 
Constant -12.60*** -14.43*** -13.26*** -14.06*** 
 (1.968) (1.205) (1.129) (2.909) 
Obs. 43 43 43 43 
R-squared .99 .99 .99 .99 
tau-statistics -3.677 -4.194 -5.027 -4.532 
Stationary at 
10% level? 
No No Yes No 
  
 
127
 
Table 3.5.  Cointegration Results with Alternative Measure Median Income (Dependent 
Variable- Real per capita Government expenditure) 
 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
y .226*** .186*** .156*** .166*** 1.686*** 
 (.054) (.042) (.047) (.041) (.233) 
τ -.499* -.876*** -.756*** -.905*** -.636*** 
 (.252) (.206) (.214) (.195) (.178) 
N .920*** 1.328*** .492* 1.080*** .271 
 (.302) (.243) (.264) (.220) (.235) 
W .350 .039 .577** .189 .044 
 (.279) (.221) (.233) (.204) (.202) 
Open  .673***    
  (.127)    
TOT   .797***   
   (.177)   
TOT*Openness    .078***  
    (.013)  
post94     2.296*** 
     (.361) 
post90      
      
post75      
      
post73      
      
vorster      
      
botha      
      
deklerk      
      
mandela      
      
mbeki      
      
Constant .434 -5.400** -1.435 -2.807 -15.4*** 
 (2.531) (2.226) (2.105) (1.912) (3.058) 
Obs. 43 43 43 43 43 
R-squared .93 .96 .95 .96 .97 
tau-stat. -2.141 -2.734 -3.227 -3.029 -2.397 
Stationary at 
10% level? 
No No No No No 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
£The alternative measure of median income is one that includes white per capita personal income for the 
period before 1994 
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Table 3.5.-Continued. 
 
Variables 
 
(6) (7) (8) (9) 
     
y .086* .197*** .175*** .096 
 (.046) (.054) (.049) (.070) 
τ -.996*** -.480* -.535** -.444** 
 (.202) (.241) (.221) (.212) 
N 1.000*** .659** .528* 1.159*** 
 (.220) (.313) (.286) (.373) 
W .536** .384 .403 .397 
 (.205) (.267) (.244) (.343) 
Open     
     
TOT     
     
TOT*Openness     
     
post94     
     
post90 -.333***    
 (.056)    
post75  .147**   
  (.068)   
post73   .222***  
   (.062)  
vorster    .124** 
    (.061) 
botha    .037 
    (.107) 
deklerk    -.165 
    (.141) 
mandela    -.223 
    (.170) 
mbeki    -.319 
    (.212) 
Constant 2.928 1.763 2.508 1.366 
 (1.887) (2.498) (2.287) (3.264) 
Obs. 43 43 43 43 
R-squared .96 .94 .95 .97 
tau-stat. -3.165 -2.376 -2.575 -3.535 
Stationary at 
10% level? 
No No No No 
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Table 3.6.  Cointegration Results with Real GDP per Capita as Median Income 
(Dependent Variable- Disaggregated Expenditures) 
 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Pub. Ord 
& Safety 
Comm. & 
Soc. Serv. 
Pub. Ord. 
& Safety 
Comm. & 
Soc. Serv. 
Pub. Ord. 
& Safety 
Comm. & 
Soc. Serv. 
       
y -.793 -.079 -.788 -.082 -.284 -.212 
 (.510) (.481) (.503) (.487) (.568) (.583) 
τ -.053 -.282 -.005 -.313 .075 -.316 
 (.230) (.217) (.230) (.223) (.230) (.236) 
N 1.692*** .654* 1.766*** .606 1.701*** .652* 
 (.358) (.337) (.358) (.346) (.338) (.347) 
W .308* .294* .354** .264* .132 .340* 
 (.149) (.140) (.152) (.147) (.175) (.179) 
post94   -.048 .031   
   (.040) (.038)   
post90     .102 -.027 
     (.061) (.062) 
Constant 5.151 3.419 5.161 3.412 -1.118 5.055 
 (6.745) (6.355) (6.650) (6.432) (7.370) (7.568) 
Obs. 20 20 20 20 20 20 
R-squared .98 .94 .98 .94 .99 .94 
tau-stat. -4.625 -3.885 -5.217 -4.504 -4.827 -4.048 
Stationary at 
10% level? 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
£For sample size of T=20, and 4 endogenous variables, the 1%, 5% and 10% percent Mackinnon critical 
values are approximately -5.66, -4.69, -4.24, respectively; for 5 variables they are -6.16, -5.15 and -4.68; 
for 6 variables they are -6.66, -5.59, -5.09. 
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Table 3.7.  Cointegration Results with Alternative Measure of Median Income 
(Dependent Variable- Disaggregated Expenditures) 
 
Variables Pub. Ord. 
& Safety 
Comm. & 
Soc. Serv. 
Pub. Ord.  
& Safety 
Comm. & 
Soc. Serv. 
Pub. Ord. 
& Safety 
Comm. & 
Soc. Serv. 
       
y .030 -.022 -1.269** -.436 .034 -.023 
 (.029) (.026) (.491) (.520) (.025) (.027) 
τ -.277 -.331** .317 -.142 .077 -.382* 
 (.170) (.150) (.266) (.282) (.203) (.215) 
N 2.152*** .652** 2.492*** .760** 1.860*** .693** 
 (.263) (.233) (.257) (.272) (.254) (.270) 
W .235 .250* .223* .246* .119 .267* 
 (.140) (.124) (.118) (.125) (.129) (.137) 
post94   -1.880** -.599   
   (.710) (.752)   
post90     .123** -.018 
     (.049) (.052) 
Constant -5.230** 2.585 7.884 6.761 -4.972*** 2.548 
 (1.777) (1.570) (5.174) (5.479) (1.530) (1.622) 
Obs. 20 20 20 20 20 20 
R-squared .98 .94 .99 .95 .94 .70 
tau-stat. -5.325 -4.551 -5.913 -4.480 -5.644 -4.725 
Stationery at 
10% level? 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
£The alternative measure of median income is one that includes white per capita personal income for the 
period before 1994 
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Table 3.8.  Cointegration Results with Real GDP as proxy for Median Income 
(Dependent Variable- Other Classifications of Disaggregated Government Expenditures) 
 
Variables 
 
(1)+ (2)++ (3) +++ (4) ++++ (5) +++++ 
y .875*** 3.357*** 1.506*** 1.442*** .576 
 (.126) (.305) (.145) (.144) (.400) 
τ -.417*** -.647** -.556*** -.604*** -1.320*** 
 (.116) (.280) (.134) (.132) (.368) 
N 1.571*** -1.377*** .702*** .860*** 3.511*** 
 (.102) (.246) (.118) (.116) (.323) 
W -.127 .441 .067 -.028 -1.709*** 
 (.109) (.264) (.126) (.124) (.346) 
post90 -.146*** -.316*** -.129*** -.144*** -.361*** 
 (.041) (.098) (.047) (.046) (.129) 
post94      
      
Constant -11.66*** -23.524*** -13.363*** -13.856*** -28.603*** 
 (1.845) (4.460) (2.130) (2.103) (5.852) 
Obs. 43 43 43 43 43 
R-squared .99 .94 .98 .98 .93 
Tau-stat. -3.447 -4.012 -3.529 -3.681 -4.483 
Stationery No No No No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
+ Government consumption  
++ Government investment 
+++ Government consumption plus investment 
++++Government spending less interest payments 
+++++Government transfers for households and subsidy for businesses 
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Table 3.8.-continued 
 
Variables 
 
(6)+ (7)++ (8) +++ (9) ++++ (10) +++++ 
y 1.087*** 4.001*** 1.709*** 1.665*** 1.136*** 
 (.090) (.245) (.107) (.106) (.294) 
τ -.189* -.209 -.360*** -.383*** -.768** 
 (.103) (.280) (.123) (.121) (.336) 
N 1.422*** -1.368*** .599*** .738*** 3.209*** 
 (.116) (.317) (.139) (.137) (.379) 
W -.070 .101 .077 -.007 -1.662*** 
 (.118) (.321) (.140) (.139) (.384) 
Post90      
      
Post94 -.136*** -.093 -.102** -.119*** -.295** 
 (.037) (.101) (.044) (.043) (.120) 
Constant -12.85*** -32.242*** -14.947*** -15.489*** -32.77*** 
 (1.564) (4.254) (1.861) (1.837) (5.094) 
Obs. 43 43 43 43 43 
R-squared .99 .93 .97 .98 .93 
Tau-stat. -3.012 -3.331 -3.146 -3.264 -4.296 
Stationary at 
10% level? 
No No No No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
+ Government consumption  
++ Government investment 
+++ Government consumption plus investment 
++++Government spending less interest payments 
+++++Government transfers for households and subsidy for businesses 
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Table 3.9.  Cointegration Results with Real GDP per Capita as Median Income and With 
Different Tax Shares (Dependent Variable- Real per capita Government expenditure) 
 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
y 1.410*** 1.572*** 1.234*** 1.704*** 1.269*** 1.103*** 1.276***
 (.095) (.107) (.151) (.171) (.243) (.099) (.093) 
N 1.272*** 1.073*** 1.547*** 1.213*** 1.882*** 1.609*** 1.277***
 (.113) (.147) (.128) (.180) (.210) (.094) (.112) 
W -.262*** -.122 -.403*** -.347*** -.599*** -.392*** -.154* 
 (.094) (.119) (.114) (.116) (.106) (.077) (.086) 
T1 -.606***       
 (.117)       
T2  -.539***     -.377*** 
  (.119)     (.091) 
T3   -.178*     
   (.099)     
T4    -.139**    
    (.057)    
T5     -.105***   
     (.029)   
T6      -.480*** -.396*** 
      (.076) (.067) 
Constant -16.5*** -16.8*** -16.8*** -19.9*** -19.6*** -5.86*** -15.0*** 
 (1.237) (1.293) (1.799) (1.504) (3.377) (1.154) (.986) 
Obs. 43 43 43 43 33 43 43 
R-squared .98 .98 .98 .98 .92 .99 .99 
Tau-stat. -3.625 -3.986 -3.459 -3.873 -5.237 -4.343 -4.774 
Stationary at 
10% level? 
No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
T1=Total tax share 
T2=Total income and wealth tax share 
T3=Individual income and wealth tax share 
T4=Corporate income tax share 
T5=VAT tax share 
T6=Production and imports tax share 
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Figure 3.1.  Government Expenditure (in Millions of Rand and Constant 2000 Prices) 
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Figure 3.2.  Government Expenditure per Capita (in Constant 2000 Prices) 
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Figure 3.3.  Government Expenditure Percentage of GDP 
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Figure 3.4.  GDP per Capita (in Constant 2000 Prices) 
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Figure 3.5.  Disaggregate Government Spending per Capita, Constant 2000 Prices 
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